Full List

Search

Recent Vulnerabilities

• CVE-2025-38426 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
• CVE-2025-38426 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
• CVE-2025-38426 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
• CVE-2025-38426 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
• CVE-2025-38426 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
• CVE-2025-38426 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Add basic validation for RAS header If RAS header read from EEPROM is corrupted, it could result in trying to allocate huge memory for reading the records. Add some validation to header fields.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38425 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read For SMBUS block read, do not continue to read if the message length passed from the device is '0' or greater than the maximum allowed bytes.
• CVE-2025-38424 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current-mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.
• CVE-2025-38424 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current-mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.
• CVE-2025-38424 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current-mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.
• CVE-2025-38424 • published on July 25, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix sample vs do_exit() Baisheng Gao reported an ARM64 crash, which Mark decoded as being a synchronous external abort -- most likely due to trying to access MMIO in bad ways. The crash further shows perf trying to do a user stack sample while in exit_mmap()'s tlb_finish_mmu() -- i.e. while tearing down the address space it is trying to access. It turns out that we stop perf after we tear down the userspace mm; a receipie for disaster, since perf likes to access userspace for various reasons. Flip this order by moving up where we stop perf in do_exit(). Additionally, harden PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN and PERF_SAMPLE_STACK_USER to abort when the current task does not have an mm (exit_mm() makes sure to set current-mm = NULL; before commencing with the actual teardown). Such that CPU wide events don't trip on this same problem.