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Recent Vulnerabilities

• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39794 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ARM: tegra: Use I/O memcpy to write to IRAM Kasan crashes the kernel trying to check boundaries when using the normal memcpy.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39793 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/memmap: cast nr_pages to size_t before shifting If the allocated size exceeds UINT_MAX, then it's necessary to cast the mr-nr_pages value to size_t to prevent it from overflowing. In practice this isn't much of a concern as the required memory size will have been validated upfront, and accounted to the user. And > 4GB sizes will be necessary to make the lack of a cast a problem, which greatly exceeds normal user locked_vm settings that are generally in the kb to mb range. However, if root is used, then accounting isn't done, and then it's possible to hit this issue.
• CVE-2025-39792 • published on September 12, 2025 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dm: Always split write BIOs to zoned device limits Any zoned DM target that requires zone append emulation will use the block layer zone write plugging. In such case, DM target drivers must not split BIOs using dm_accept_partial_bio() as doing so can potentially lead to deadlocks with queue freeze operations. Regular write operations used to emulate zone append operations also cannot be split by the target driver as that would result in an invalid writen sector value return using the BIO sector. In order for zoned DM target drivers to avoid such incorrect BIO splitting, we must ensure that large BIOs are split before being passed to the map() function of the target, thus guaranteeing that the limits for the mapped device are not exceeded. dm-crypt and dm-flakey are the only target drivers supporting zoned devices and using dm_accept_partial_bio(). In the case of dm-crypt, this function is used to split BIOs to the internal max_write_size limit (which will be suppressed in a different patch). However, since crypt_alloc_buffer() uses a bioset allowing only up to BIO_MAX_VECS (256) vectors in a BIO. The dm-crypt device max_segments limit, which is not set and so default to BLK_MAX_SEGMENTS (128), must thus be respected and write BIOs split accordingly. In the case of dm-flakey, since zone append emulation is not required, the block layer zone write plugging is not used and no splitting of BIOs required. Modify the function dm_zone_bio_needs_split() to use the block layer helper function bio_needs_zone_write_plugging() to force a call to bio_split_to_limits() in dm_split_and_process_bio(). This allows DM target drivers to avoid using dm_accept_partial_bio() for write operations on zoned DM devices.