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• CVE-2026-23210 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix PTP NULL pointer dereference during VSI rebuild Fix race condition where PTP periodic work runs while VSI is being rebuilt, accessing NULL vsi-rx_rings. The sequence was: 1. ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset() cancels PTP work 2. ice_ptp_rebuild() immediately queues PTP work 3. VSI rebuild happens AFTER ice_ptp_rebuild() 4. PTP work runs and accesses NULL vsi->rx_rings Fix: Keep PTP work cancelled during rebuild, only queue it after VSI rebuild completes in ice_rebuild(). Added ice_ptp_queue_work() helper function to encapsulate the logic for queuing PTP work, ensuring it's only queued when PTP is supported and the state is ICE_PTP_READY. Error log: [ 121.392544] ice 0000:60:00.1: PTP reset successful [ 121.392692] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 121.392712] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 121.392720] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 121.392727] PGD 0 [ 121.392734] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 121.392746] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1005 Comm: ice-ptp-0000:60 Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc6+ #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 121.392761] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 121.392773] RIP: 0010:ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+0xbf/0x150 [ice] [ 121.393042] Call Trace: [ 121.393047] TASK> [ 121.393055] ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x69/0x180 [ice] [ 121.393202] kthread_worker_fn+0xa2/0x260 [ 121.393216] ? __pfx_ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 121.393359] ? __pfx_kthread_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393371] kthread+0x10d/0x230 [ 121.393382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393393] ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 [ 121.393407] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393417] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 121.393432]
• CVE-2026-23210 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix PTP NULL pointer dereference during VSI rebuild Fix race condition where PTP periodic work runs while VSI is being rebuilt, accessing NULL vsi-rx_rings. The sequence was: 1. ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset() cancels PTP work 2. ice_ptp_rebuild() immediately queues PTP work 3. VSI rebuild happens AFTER ice_ptp_rebuild() 4. PTP work runs and accesses NULL vsi->rx_rings Fix: Keep PTP work cancelled during rebuild, only queue it after VSI rebuild completes in ice_rebuild(). Added ice_ptp_queue_work() helper function to encapsulate the logic for queuing PTP work, ensuring it's only queued when PTP is supported and the state is ICE_PTP_READY. Error log: [ 121.392544] ice 0000:60:00.1: PTP reset successful [ 121.392692] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 121.392712] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 121.392720] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 121.392727] PGD 0 [ 121.392734] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 121.392746] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1005 Comm: ice-ptp-0000:60 Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc6+ #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 121.392761] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 121.392773] RIP: 0010:ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+0xbf/0x150 [ice] [ 121.393042] Call Trace: [ 121.393047] TASK> [ 121.393055] ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x69/0x180 [ice] [ 121.393202] kthread_worker_fn+0xa2/0x260 [ 121.393216] ? __pfx_ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 121.393359] ? __pfx_kthread_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393371] kthread+0x10d/0x230 [ 121.393382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393393] ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 [ 121.393407] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393417] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 121.393432]
• CVE-2026-23210 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix PTP NULL pointer dereference during VSI rebuild Fix race condition where PTP periodic work runs while VSI is being rebuilt, accessing NULL vsi-rx_rings. The sequence was: 1. ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset() cancels PTP work 2. ice_ptp_rebuild() immediately queues PTP work 3. VSI rebuild happens AFTER ice_ptp_rebuild() 4. PTP work runs and accesses NULL vsi->rx_rings Fix: Keep PTP work cancelled during rebuild, only queue it after VSI rebuild completes in ice_rebuild(). Added ice_ptp_queue_work() helper function to encapsulate the logic for queuing PTP work, ensuring it's only queued when PTP is supported and the state is ICE_PTP_READY. Error log: [ 121.392544] ice 0000:60:00.1: PTP reset successful [ 121.392692] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 121.392712] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 121.392720] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 121.392727] PGD 0 [ 121.392734] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 121.392746] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1005 Comm: ice-ptp-0000:60 Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc6+ #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 121.392761] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 121.392773] RIP: 0010:ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+0xbf/0x150 [ice] [ 121.393042] Call Trace: [ 121.393047] TASK> [ 121.393055] ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x69/0x180 [ice] [ 121.393202] kthread_worker_fn+0xa2/0x260 [ 121.393216] ? __pfx_ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 121.393359] ? __pfx_kthread_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393371] kthread+0x10d/0x230 [ 121.393382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393393] ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 [ 121.393407] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393417] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 121.393432]
• CVE-2026-23210 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix PTP NULL pointer dereference during VSI rebuild Fix race condition where PTP periodic work runs while VSI is being rebuilt, accessing NULL vsi-rx_rings. The sequence was: 1. ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset() cancels PTP work 2. ice_ptp_rebuild() immediately queues PTP work 3. VSI rebuild happens AFTER ice_ptp_rebuild() 4. PTP work runs and accesses NULL vsi->rx_rings Fix: Keep PTP work cancelled during rebuild, only queue it after VSI rebuild completes in ice_rebuild(). Added ice_ptp_queue_work() helper function to encapsulate the logic for queuing PTP work, ensuring it's only queued when PTP is supported and the state is ICE_PTP_READY. Error log: [ 121.392544] ice 0000:60:00.1: PTP reset successful [ 121.392692] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 121.392712] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 121.392720] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 121.392727] PGD 0 [ 121.392734] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 121.392746] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1005 Comm: ice-ptp-0000:60 Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc6+ #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 121.392761] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 121.392773] RIP: 0010:ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+0xbf/0x150 [ice] [ 121.393042] Call Trace: [ 121.393047] TASK> [ 121.393055] ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x69/0x180 [ice] [ 121.393202] kthread_worker_fn+0xa2/0x260 [ 121.393216] ? __pfx_ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 121.393359] ? __pfx_kthread_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393371] kthread+0x10d/0x230 [ 121.393382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393393] ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 [ 121.393407] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393417] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 121.393432]
• CVE-2026-23210 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix PTP NULL pointer dereference during VSI rebuild Fix race condition where PTP periodic work runs while VSI is being rebuilt, accessing NULL vsi-rx_rings. The sequence was: 1. ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset() cancels PTP work 2. ice_ptp_rebuild() immediately queues PTP work 3. VSI rebuild happens AFTER ice_ptp_rebuild() 4. PTP work runs and accesses NULL vsi->rx_rings Fix: Keep PTP work cancelled during rebuild, only queue it after VSI rebuild completes in ice_rebuild(). Added ice_ptp_queue_work() helper function to encapsulate the logic for queuing PTP work, ensuring it's only queued when PTP is supported and the state is ICE_PTP_READY. Error log: [ 121.392544] ice 0000:60:00.1: PTP reset successful [ 121.392692] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 121.392712] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 121.392720] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 121.392727] PGD 0 [ 121.392734] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 121.392746] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1005 Comm: ice-ptp-0000:60 Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc6+ #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 121.392761] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 121.392773] RIP: 0010:ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+0xbf/0x150 [ice] [ 121.393042] Call Trace: [ 121.393047] TASK> [ 121.393055] ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x69/0x180 [ice] [ 121.393202] kthread_worker_fn+0xa2/0x260 [ 121.393216] ? __pfx_ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 121.393359] ? __pfx_kthread_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393371] kthread+0x10d/0x230 [ 121.393382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393393] ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 [ 121.393407] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393417] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 121.393432]
• CVE-2026-23210 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ice: Fix PTP NULL pointer dereference during VSI rebuild Fix race condition where PTP periodic work runs while VSI is being rebuilt, accessing NULL vsi-rx_rings. The sequence was: 1. ice_ptp_prepare_for_reset() cancels PTP work 2. ice_ptp_rebuild() immediately queues PTP work 3. VSI rebuild happens AFTER ice_ptp_rebuild() 4. PTP work runs and accesses NULL vsi->rx_rings Fix: Keep PTP work cancelled during rebuild, only queue it after VSI rebuild completes in ice_rebuild(). Added ice_ptp_queue_work() helper function to encapsulate the logic for queuing PTP work, ensuring it's only queued when PTP is supported and the state is ICE_PTP_READY. Error log: [ 121.392544] ice 0000:60:00.1: PTP reset successful [ 121.392692] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 121.392712] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 121.392720] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 121.392727] PGD 0 [ 121.392734] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 121.392746] CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 1005 Comm: ice-ptp-0000:60 Tainted: G S 6.19.0-rc6+ #4 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 121.392761] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC [ 121.392773] RIP: 0010:ice_ptp_update_cached_phctime+0xbf/0x150 [ice] [ 121.393042] Call Trace: [ 121.393047] TASK> [ 121.393055] ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x69/0x180 [ice] [ 121.393202] kthread_worker_fn+0xa2/0x260 [ 121.393216] ? __pfx_ice_ptp_periodic_work+0x10/0x10 [ice] [ 121.393359] ? __pfx_kthread_worker_fn+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393371] kthread+0x10d/0x230 [ 121.393382] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393393] ret_from_fork+0x273/0x2b0 [ 121.393407] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 121.393417] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 121.393432]
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.
• CVE-2026-23209 • published on February 14, 2026 In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: macvlan: fix error recovery in macvlan_common_newlink() valis provided a nice repro to crash the kernel: ip link add p1 type veth peer p2 ip link set address 00:00:00:00:00:20 dev p1 ip link set up dev p1 ip link set up dev p2 ip link add mv0 link p2 type macvlan mode source ip link add invalid% link p2 type macvlan mode source macaddr add 00:00:00:00:00:20 ping -c1 -I p1 1.2.3.4 He also gave a very detailed analysis: quote valis The issue is triggered when a new macvlan link is created with MACVLAN_MODE_SOURCE mode and MACVLAN_MACADDR_ADD (or MACVLAN_MACADDR_SET) parameter, lower device already has a macvlan port and register_netdevice() called from macvlan_common_newlink() fails (e.g. because of the invalid link name). In this case macvlan_hash_add_source is called from macvlan_change_sources() / macvlan_common_newlink(): This adds a reference to vlan to the port's vlan_source_hash using macvlan_source_entry. vlan is a pointer to the priv data of the link that is being created. When register_netdevice() fails, the error is returned from macvlan_newlink() to rtnl_newlink_create(): if (ops->newlink) err = ops->newlink(dev, ¶ms, extack); else err = register_netdevice(dev); if (err < 0) { free_netdev(dev); goto out; } and free_netdev() is called, causing a kvfree() on the struct net_device that is still referenced in the source entry attached to the lower device's macvlan port. Now all packets sent on the macvlan port with a matching source mac address will trigger a use-after-free in macvlan_forward_source(). With all that, my fix is to make sure we call macvlan_flush_sources() regardless of @create value whenever "goto destroy_macvlan_port;" path is taken. Many thanks to valis for following up on this issue.