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• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31979 • published on March 11, 2026 Himmelblau is an interoperability suite for Microsoft Azure Entra ID and Intune. Prior to 3.1.0 and 2.3.8, the himmelblaud-tasks daemon, running as root, writes Kerberos cache files under /tmp/krb5cc_uid without symlink protections. Since commit 87a51ee, PrivateTmp is explicitly removed from the tasks daemon's systemd hardening, exposing it to the host /tmp. A local user can exploit this via symlink attacks to chown or overwrite arbitrary files, achieving local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.1.0 and 2.3.8.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.
• CVE-2026-31976 • published on March 11, 2026 xygeni-action is the GitHub Action for Xygeni Scanner. On March 3, 2026, an attacker with access to compromised credentials created a series of pull requests (#46, #47, #48) injecting obfuscated shell code into action.yml. The PRs were blocked by branch protection rules and never merged into the main branch. However, the attacker used the compromised GitHub App credentials to move the mutable v5 tag to point at the malicious commit (4bf1d4e19ad81a3e8d4063755ae0f482dd3baf12) from one of the unmerged PRs. This commit remained in the repository's git object store, and any workflow referencing @v5 would fetch and execute it. This is a supply chain compromise via tag poisoning. Any GitHub Actions workflow referencing xygeni/xygeni-action@v5 during the affected window (approximately March 3–10, 2026) executed a C2 implant that granted the attacker arbitrary command execution on the CI runner for up to 180 seconds per workflow run.