-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23410
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference
There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
-
CVE-2026-23409
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix differential encoding verification
Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To
prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain
terminates.
Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs.
1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been
marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked.
This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated
as a chain that has already been verified.
2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain
check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i.
Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification
was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state.
Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a
different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us
to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of
the second error as any already verified state is already marked.
-
CVE-2026-23409
•
published on April 1, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
apparmor: fix differential encoding verification
Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To
prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain
terminates.
Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs.
1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been
marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked.
This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated
as a chain that has already been verified.
2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain
check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i.
Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification
was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state.
Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a
different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us
to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of
the second error as any already verified state is already marked.
