-
CVE-2026-99229
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/wait: don't spin on a stuck overflow list
As long as IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT is set, io_cqring_wait_schedule()
returns right away, before it gets to look at signals or arms the timeout,
for io_cqring_wait() to flush the overflow list. If that doesn't empty the
list, and the CQ ring doesn't hold the number of events the caller wants,
the loop starts over, with the same result. The task spins in the kernel,
and can't be killed.
The assumption is that this can't happen: if CQEs can't be flushed, the
ring is full, and min_events is capped to the size of the ring. But:
- With IORING_SETUP_CQE_MIXED a 32b CQE needs two contiguous entries. It
is stuck on the list if a single one is free, and then the ring holds
less than cq_entries events. A single threaded application that asks
for as many events as the ring has entries never gets out of
io_uring_enter().
- Whether the ring is full is up to the CQ head, which the application
can write to. While one thread waits for events on an empty ring,
another one can move the head back so that the ring looks full and
have a CQE overflow. The waiter can't be stopped any more, not even by
SIGKILL.
Only the application can make room in the CQ ring. Return to it if the
list could not be flushed.
-
CVE-2026-99228
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: don't lose the signal that ends work
When a thread exits, only its tracked requests are cancelled. Then its
io-wq is torn down. io_wq_exit_workers() signals every worker, to get it
out of an interruptible sleep, and waits for all of them to exit. Before
they do, they go through the work that is left. Unbounded work is
cancelled. Bounded work is run, as it is expected to end by itself.
Not all of it does. An open has no file yet, so it counts as bounded, and
the open of a FIFO waits for the other end. That is what the signal is for.
But the workers are signalled once, and a worker that hasn't started the
work by then loses the signal:
io_wq_exit_workers() io_worker_handle_work()
io_wq_worker_wake()
set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
io_assign_current_work()
io_run_task_work()
clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
io_wq_submit_work()
fifo_open()
wait_for_partner()
wait_for_completion_timeout()
The thread never gets out of do_exit():
IORING_OP_OPENAT of a FIFO without a writer, IOSQE_ASYNC
exit of the thread that has submitted it
hangs in more than 9 of 10 attempts (4 CPUs, KVM), until the process is
killed.
Set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL for bounded work that is started with IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
set. The bit is set before the workers are signalled, and it is tested
after the flag has been cleared, with clear_notify_signal() providing the
barrier. So either the flag stays, or the bit is seen.
Work that is started while the io-wq exits is treated like work that is
being run at that time: it isn't interrupted unless it waits
interruptibly.
-
CVE-2026-99220
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs
The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
Call Trace:
TASK
__key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
__do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.
-
CVE-2026-99216
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: Don't reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths
In two places, current code forces vmbus_connection.conn_state to
DISCONNECTED prior to calling vmbus_disconnect(). But vmbus_disconnect()
calls vmbus_initiate_unload(), which unloads the VMBus connection
only if the conn_state is CONNECTED. Consequently, the connection
remains and the Hyper-V host might continue to send messages or post
VMBus interrupts.
The problem was introduced in commit 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V:
Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback"), in that
vmbus_initiate_unload() started checking the current connection
state before doing the unload. This commit removed some occurrences
where conn_state was forced to DISCONNECTED, but these two remained,
apparently due to an oversight at the time.
Fix this by not forcing conn_state to DISCONNECTED during VMBus exit,
or if a failure occurs when establishing the connection in the first
place. Whatever value conn_state has at the time is then read by
vmbus_initiate_unload() to determine if there is a connection to
be unloaded.
-
CVE-2026-99213
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established
Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED - TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can
race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on
ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what
happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events
that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already
set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it.
Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending().
Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to
memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs,
and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table.
list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130
Call Trace:
vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460
vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480
process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560
worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60
kthread+0x36e/0x470
ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore
signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link.
-
CVE-2026-99209
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: skip eviction of a BO with no resource
xe_evict_flags() switches on tbo-resource->mem_type to choose an
eviction placement. An xe BO can reach eviction with no ttm.resource,
e.g. an imported dma-buf BO whose resource was freed during teardown
while its attachment is still live: the exporter then invalidates it via
xe_dma_buf_move_notify() -> xe_bo_evict(), and the switch dereferences a
NULL resource and faults.
A BO with no resource has nothing placed or mapped, so there is nothing
to evict. Return an empty placement (num_placement = 0), mirroring the
handling already used for non-xe scatter-gather BOs just above;
ttm_bo_validate() then takes the pipeline-gutting path and returns 0.
Without the fix the xe_dma_buf@xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource
dynamic live selftest will fail with below stack.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: 0010:xe_evict_flags+0xf4/0x140 [xe]
Call Trace:
TASK>
xe_bo_evict+0x40/0xa0 [xe]
? ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting+0x71/0x180 [ttm]
xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource+0x182/0x440 [xe]
xe_dma_buf_kunit+0x387/0x580 [xe]
v2: Add Fixes tag and failure info in commit text (Matt Brost)
(cherry picked from commit dbcfaac6331f1fcb0c2fe3ad3e9adb1e5d43ec0c)
-
CVE-2026-99208
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Zero OA buffer at allocation
ttm_bo_type_kernel BOs are not guaranteed to be zeroed on allocation and
may contain data from previously freed pages. Since the OA buffer is
mmap'able by userspace, this can expose stale kernel memory contents.
Streams opened with DRM_XE_OA_PROPERTY_OA_DISABLED allocate the OA
buffer without calling xe_oa_init_oa_buffer(). Zero the buffer at
allocation to prevent information disclosure through mmap.
The existing zeroing in xe_oa_init_oa_buffer() remains necessary for
zero report-id/timestamp detection on enable/re-enable.
(cherry picked from commit 126c4c5388f9311a390b9b254a835b0cf0f55331)
-
CVE-2026-99204
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/dlm: Protect the recovery list during debugfs reads
Recovery participant records must remain alive while debug_state_print()
walks reco.node_data and formats their fields. The formatter holds
dlm-spinlock, but the recovery participant list is protected by
dlm_reco_state_lock. In particular, dlm_destroy_recovery_area() detaches
the list under dlm_reco_state_lock and frees the detached records after
releasing it. A concurrent debugfs open can therefore read freed memory.
Protect the participant traversal and field reads in debug_state_print()
with dlm_reco_state_lock, matching the existing list writers. This also
serializes the traversal against list_add_tail() during recovery-area
initialization. Make the existing lock available to the debug code
through dlmcommon.h; the lock remains internal to the OCFS2 DLM module.
Release dlm->spinlock after formatting the other domain state and before
acquiring dlm_reco_state_lock, so the debug reader does not nest the two
locks. Leave recovery list insertion, detachment and freeing unchanged.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88810662ef80 by task dlm-state-stres/896
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 896 Comm: dlm-state-stres Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
debug_state_open+0x1169/0x12d0
? __pfx_debug_state_open+0x10/0x10
full_proxy_open_regular+0x193/0x310
do_dentry_open+0x595/0x12d0
? __pfx_full_proxy_open_regular+0x10/0x10
vfs_open_consume+0xd1/0x400
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
path_openat+0x18d0/0x2020
? __pfx_path_openat+0x10/0x10
do_file_open+0x21e/0x470
? __pfx_do_file_open+0x10/0x10
? _raw_spin_unlock+0x23/0x40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? alloc_fd+0x3a6/0x6b0
do_sys_openat2+0xf4/0x1b0
? __pfx_do_sys_openat2+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __fput+0x5b5/0xa60
__x64_sys_openat+0x136/0x1e0
? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
[Register dump omitted.]
Allocated by task 880:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
dlm_remaster_locks+0x147/0x1d90
dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
kthread+0x351/0x460
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Freed by task 880:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x308/0x580
dlm_destroy_recovery_area+0x285/0x460
dlm_remaster_locks+0x17c4/0x1d90
dlm_do_recovery+0xde1/0x1580
dlm_recovery_thread+0x109/0x300
kthread+0x351/0x460
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88810662ef80
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-32 of size 32
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
freed 32-byte region [ffff88810662ef80, ffff88810662efa0)
[Page and memory-state dumps omitted.]
-
CVE-2026-99203
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
pipe: preserve existing fasync readers on writer setup failure
F_SETFL and FIOASYNC decide whether to invoke -fasync() before
pipe_fasync() takes pipe->mutex. Two enables of one O_RDWR FIFO can
therefore both enter the callback.
fasync_helper() allocates before checking for an existing entry. If the
first enable installs both entries, a second enable can update the
reader entry and then fail the allocation for the writer entry. The
error path removes the pre-existing reader entry, clearing FASYNC while
the writer entry remains registered. __fput() then skips ->fasync(), so a
later pipe notification can dereference the freed file or its f_owner.
An unprivileged memory-pressure reproducer triggers a KASAN
slab-use-after-free in send_sigio() through this path.
Keep the reader helper's result and undo the registration only if this
call added it. The pipe mutex serializes changes to both lists, so a
failed new registration still removes its reader, while a failed
duplicate preserves the existing registrations and FASYNC. Successful
duplicate enables continue to update fa_fd as before.
-
CVE-2026-99198
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: actions: Move setting of netops to fix crash
owl_emac_probe() calls owl_emac_phy_init(), which connects the PHY,
before netdev-netdev_ops is assigned. phy_attach_direct() ->
phy_link_topo_add_phy() reads dev->netdev_ops through
netdev_need_ops_lock() since the commit in question, so probing crashes
with a NULL pointer dereference when CONFIG_NET_SHAPER is enabled.
Assign netdev_ops before the PHY attach, as was done for emac in commit
7c9f391ec89c ("net: emac: move setting of netops to fix crash").
-
CVE-2026-99192
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: bcmgenet: unshare the skb before writing the control block
bcmgenet stores first_cb, last_cb and bytes_sent in the skb control
block and reads them back on completion to free the skb and credit BQL.
ether_setup() leaves IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set, so the stack can resubmit
a shared skb that is still in the ring. The next transmit overwrites
last_cb, so the earlier slots complete without crediting their bytes
and BQL stalls the queue until the watchdog resets it.
Unshare the skb before writing the control block.
Reproduce with pktgen in clone_skb mode, which hands the driver the same
skb while earlier copies are still in the ring:
modprobe pktgen
pg=/proc/net/pktgen
echo "add_device eth0" $pg/kpktgend_0
echo "dst_mac AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF" > $pg/eth0
echo "dst 192.0.2.1" > $pg/eth0
echo "clone_skb 8" > $pg/eth0
echo "count 0" > $pg/eth0
echo start > $pg/pgctrl &
sleep 5
echo stop > $pg/pgctrl
wait
cat /sys/class/net/eth0/queues/tx-0/byte_queue_limits/inflight
inflight stays nonzero on the now idle queue. clone_skb 0 leaves it at
zero.
-
CVE-2026-99177
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Fix page dirtying in sev_gmem_post_populate()
set_page_dirty() requires that the caller holds some kind of lock to
ensure that the page's mapping does not concurrently go away.
That is not the case for a random page we got from get_user_pages_fast(),
so use set_page_dirty_lock().
[sean: tag for stable]
-
CVE-2026-99174
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: free the sbi after a grace period
ext4_get_link() follows a symlink that keeps its target in a data block
in rcu pathwalk mode with ext4_getblk(EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CACHED_NOWAIT).
That reads s_mount_state in the ASSERT() of ext4_getblk() and again in
ext4_es_lookup_extent(), and the lookup bumps the extent status hit or
miss counter, all through sb-s_fs_info.
ext4_put_super() destroys those counters, clears sb->s_fs_info and frees
the sbi without waiting for a grace period. A pathwalk that is still in
ext4_get_link() when the last reference to the mount goes away then
dereferences a NULL s_fs_info, the freed sbi or the destroyed percpu
counters.
With a pathwalk held up in ext4_get_link() while the last reference
goes away:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000000a8-0x00000000000000af]
RIP: 0010:ext4_getblk+0xf0/0x640
Call Trace:
TASK>
ext4_get_link+0x26c/0x410
pick_link+0xf96/0x1780
step_into_slowpath+0x9b8/0x1250
path_lookupat+0x484/0xb00
filename_lookup+0x1f1/0x5b0
vfs_statx+0xd7/0x3b0
vfs_fstatat+0x4d/0x90
__do_sys_newfstatat+0xa0/0x100
do_syscall_64+0x10e/0x5e0
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
So far that has been hard to hit. umount(2) waits for a grace period in
namespace_unlock() before it drops the mount, so only a mount whose last
reference goes away elsewhere, like the close of a file or a chdir out of
a lazily unmounted directory, can race a walker.
Keep sb->s_fs_info and free the sbi together with the extent status
counters after a grace period. Split the counters out of
ext4_es_unregister_shrinker() for that. The shrinker still gets wasted
in ext4_put_super(), the counters go with the sbi.
-
CVE-2026-99168
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mshv_vtl: Check per-CPU register page before mmap
Register-page setup is optional for each CPU. If allocation or
registration fails, mshv_vtl_configure_reg_page() warns and leaves that
CPU's reg_page NULL, but initial context setup continues successfully.
Meanwhile, successful setup on another CPU sets the global
mshv_has_reg_page flag.
mshv_vtl_fault() checks this global flag before selecting the requested
CPU's register page. With mixed setup results across online CPUs, the
check passes even for a CPU with no register page, reaching
get_page(NULL) when userspace faults in that mapping.
Check the selected per-CPU register page before taking its reference and
return VM_FAULT_SIGBUS if it is absent.
-
CVE-2026-99163
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/histograms: Reject non-stacktrace fields for synthetic stacktrace fields
In check_synth_field(), when a synthetic event field is a stacktrace
(field-is_stack) and the histogram field is not a "long[" stacktrace
array, validation falls through to the generic size and signedness
comparison.
Because parse_synth_field() sets a stacktrace field's type to
"__data_loc unsigned long[]", its size is sizeof(u64) and
synth_field_signed() marks it as signed. Consequently, any 8-byte
signed scalar histogram field passes the fallback check, and its scalar
value is subsequently dereferenced as a kernel stacktrace pointer in
get_field_size() and trace_stack().
Furthermore, checking strstr(hist_field->type, "long[") is insufficient
because tracepoint fields defined with __bitmask() or __rel_bitmask()
also have type "__data_loc unsigned long[]" or "__rel_loc unsigned
long[]", whilst create_hist_field() treats them as 4-byte scalar values
without HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE.
Propagate HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE to variable references and field
variables (whilst excluding variable aliases from per-element
stacktrace capture), and reject any mismatch between
HIST_FIELD_FL_STACKTRACE and field->is_stack in check_synth_field().
-
CVE-2026-99162
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: shared: fix use-after-free bug when adding shared proxies
The GPIO lookup table can stay alive for longer than the kobject whose
name string's address we're assigning to lookup-dev_id. Fix a potential
UAF by duplicating the string.
-
CVE-2026-99153
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: libiscsi: Validate the ITT reflected in a Reject PDU
A Reject PDU carries a copy of the header it rejects, and
iscsi_handle_reject() takes the ITT out of that copy to find the task to
clean up:
memcpy(&rejected_pdu, data, sizeof(struct iscsi_hdr));
...
task = iscsi_itt_to_task(conn, rejected_pdu.itt);
That value is whatever the target put there. iscsi_itt_to_task() bounds
the index against cmds_max and checks nothing else, so any task in the
pool can be named, and iscsi_nop_out_rsp() then completes it.
An index that has never been used gives a NULL task-conn: the pool is
zeroed at session setup and conn is assigned only when a task is
allocated. If the task was used and returned, iscsi_complete_task() hits
its WARN_ON_ONCE(task->state == ISCSI_TASK_FREE) and the refcount
underflows. An in-flight SCSI command is completed as successful - a 1
MiB read returned 1048576 with none of its buffer written and no
warning.
Validate the reflected ITT the way iscsi_itt_to_ctask() validates a
command ITT, and require the task to be in flight and not a SCSI
command.
[ 6.248477] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[ 6.249357] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067]
[ 6.249951] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISCSI1-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 6.250718] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 6.251616] RIP: 0010:iscsi_nop_out_rsp.constprop.0+0x46/0x160
[ 6.252043] Code: c1 ea 03 48 83 ec 08 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 f5 00 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8b 6b 58 48 8d 7d 60 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 c0 00 00 00 48 8b 45 60 48 39 c3 74 50 48 b8 00
[ 6.252813] RSP: 0018:ffff88806c907b80 EFLAGS: 00010206
[ 6.253042] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800607e000 RCX: ffffffff8d571a25
[ 6.253345] RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: ffff88806c907c38 RDI: 0000000000000060
[ 6.253642] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: fffffbfff235a504
[ 6.253947] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 7463656e6e6f6320 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 6.254251] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88806c907c38 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 6.254549] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d95bc000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 6.254887] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 6.255140] CR2: 00007fc393e8ffc0 CR3: 0000000005252006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0
[ 6.255439] PKRU: 55555554
[ 6.255564] Call Trace:
[ 6.255674]
[ 6.255768] __iscsi_complete_pdu+0x18bf/0x22a0
[ 6.256733] iscsi_complete_pdu+0x54/0xa0
[ 6.256905] iscsi_tcp_data_recv_done+0xf4/0x250
[ 6.257103] iscsi_tcp_recv_skb+0x31e/0xec0
[ 6.257680] iscsi_sw_tcp_recv+0x12f/0x390
[ 6.258061] __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810
[ 6.258853] iscsi_sw_tcp_data_ready+0x18b/0x510
[ 6.259808] tcp_data_queue+0x1f13/0x4cd0
[ 6.260567] tcp_rcv_established+0x8a5/0x3a00
[ 6.261931] tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x449/0x960
[ 6.262269] tcp_v4_rcv+0x2245/0x3bc0
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CVE-2026-99150
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: don't drop the runtime PM reference twice in amdgpu_gpr
amdgpu_debugfs_gpr_read() drops its runtime PM reference right after
reading the wave registers. When copying them to userspace fails, it
jumps to the err label, which drops the reference a second time. A read
into a bad buffer on Navi31 either steals a reference somebody else
holds (power/runtime_usage goes from 1 to 0) or underflows the count:
amdgpu 0000:03:00.0: Runtime PM usage count underflow!
The registers are already in the kernel buffer at that point, so finish
the hardware access first and copy the buffer with a single
copy_to_user() instead of the put_user() loop with its own error path.
(cherry picked from commit 31035bbd74f7c3e10c163db875b8e67f8b50ee6a)
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CVE-2026-99146
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/dmc: Add sanity check for DMC load address
For DMC firmware header version 3, the firmware load address is stored
in dmc_info-start_mmioaddr and later used by dmc_load_program().
Unlike the MMIO address table, the firmware load address is not
validated. Add a sanity check to ensure it is within the valid range.
BSpec: 69671, 68378
(cherry picked from commit 5e47ee5c76ca9becde8df4ad5202845b7ffcbc4c)
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CVE-2026-99145
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Don't transfer shrinker pages for pinned bos on purgeable state change
Pinned bos have their pages removed from the shrinker's shrinkable /
purgeable counts on pin, and added back on unpin according to the
bo's purgeable state at that time.
However, xe_bo_set_purgeable_shrinker() unconditionally transfers
pages between the shrinkable and purgeable counts. If the purgeable
state of a pinned bo changes, for example by userspace madvising
DONTNEED on a VMA of a bo that is also pinned as a scanout buffer,
this underflows one count and, after unpin, leaves the other one
permanently inflated.
Only update the purgeable flag for pinned bos, and leave the page
accounting to unpin.
(cherry picked from commit afe6bc012034123fd838328668e609bf57e46bd3)