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CVE-2026-97187
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published on November 17, 2026
GitLab has remediated an issue in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 17.6 before 19.3.9, 19.4 before 19.4.8, and 19.5 before 19.5.6 that under certain conditions could have allowed an authenticated user to read Kubernetes Secrets from other namespaces in clusters connected through the GitLab agent for Kubernetes due to incorrect authorization in workspaces.
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CVE-2026-96841
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published on November 18, 2026
The ITRO Popup Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'custom_html' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 5.2.6 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with subscriber-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. This is only exploitable by low-privileged roles such as Subscriber when an administrator has explicitly granted that role access to the plugin settings page via the plugin's role selection option.
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CVE-2026-96665
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published on November 18, 2026
The SendPress Newsletters plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'sp_firstname' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.26.1.20 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The public subscriber-management route uses an unsigned, forgeable base64-encoded JSON token, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to impersonate any subscriber and obtain a valid nonce — bypassing the POST handler's only access control check.
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CVE-2026-96571
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published on November 18, 2026
The FancyBox for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via Comment Anchor 'href' Attribute in all versions up to, and including, 3.4.2 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires the attacker to wrap the payload anchor around a smilie shortcode (e.g., :mrgreen:), which WordPress renders as an <img> element, satisfying the plugin's a:has(img) enrollment selector and disguising the malicious link as an ordinary comment emoticon.
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CVE-2026-95849
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published on November 17, 2026
Linkwarden is a self-hosted, open-source collaborative bookmark manager to collect, organize and archive webpages. Prior to 2.15.0, .github/workflows/check-branch.yml runs on the privileged pull_request_target event and interpolates the attacker-controlled github.head_ref source branch name unquoted into a run: shell script. An unauthenticated attacker can open a pull request from a fork with shell metacharacters in its branch name, causing arbitrary commands to execute in the base repository's privileged CI job before the branch comparison result matters. The job has access to GITHUB_TOKEN and any exposed secrets, allowing secret exfiltration and, when workflow token permissions allow repository writes, modification of repository content. This issue is fixed in version 2.15.0.
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CVE-2026-95839
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published on November 16, 2026
containerd is an open-source container runtime. From 2.2.0 until 2.2.10, 2.3.7, and 2.4.2, image manifest processing through the transfer service can encounter a child descriptor containing the io.containerd.manifest.subject annotation and a malformed digest. Pulling or importing such an image, including through a default CRI PullImage request, can trigger an unrecovered panic and crash the containerd daemon. In Kubernetes, kubelet retries can repeatedly trigger the crash and disrupt container operations on the worker node. This issue is fixed in versions 2.2.10, 2.3.7, and 2.4.2.
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CVE-2026-95823
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published on November 18, 2026
tcp_pkt_linearize() in subsys/net/ip/tcp.c is used by th_get() whenever a received TCP header is not contiguous in a single net_buf. While pulling the header bytes out of the following fragments, the loop called net_buf_unref() on an emptied fragment without first detaching its frags pointer. net_buf_unref() walks the whole fragment list, so the payload buffers still linked behind that fragment were freed as well, and the stale pointer was then reinstalled into the packet as buf-frags, producing a use-after-free and a later double free during packet teardown. The same loop also advanced to second->frags unconditionally: when the fragment still held payload after the header remainder was pulled, it was spliced out of the packet without ever being unreferenced, permanently leaking that buffer and silently dropping the data it carried.
The defect is reached from tcp_recv() via th_get() on every received TCP segment, before connection lookup or any header validation, so a single unauthenticated segment that matches a listening socket is sufficient. An attacker only needs the TCP header to straddle a net_buf boundary, which they can arrange from off-link: IPv6 extension headers are accepted on receive and their length is added to the header offset by th_get(), so a Destination Options header of a suitable length places the TCP header across the boundary of the fixed-size receive buffers (CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE). Packet chains assembled from several sources - IPv4/IPv6 reassembly, 6LoWPAN/802.15.4 reassembly, tunnel or virtual interfaces that strip an outer header, or drivers producing scatter-gather chains - can additionally present a short interior fragment that the loop empties exactly, which is the case that frees the remainder of the packet while it is still in use.
The reliably reachable consequence is exhaustion of the receive buffer pool: each crafted segment leaks one net_buf from the fixed CONFIG_NET_BUF_RX_COUNT pool, the buffers are never reclaimed, and once the pool is empty the device can no longer receive network traffic until it is rebooted. Where a fragment is emptied exactly, the impact rises to memory corruption: freed pool buffers are written through by the remainder of the loop, their contents may be delivered to the application, and the packet is double-freed on teardown.
The fix saves and clears second->frags before the net_buf_unref() so only the emptied header fragment is released, and advances to the next fragment only when second->len == 0, keeping any fragment that still holds payload in the packet. This restores the detach-before-unref ownership pattern used elsewhere in the stack, for example in net_pkt_trim_buffer().
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CVE-2026-95822
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published on November 17, 2026
The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5_tcp_connect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy-sa_family) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: set_context_proxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsock_connect_ctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AF_INET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct net_sockaddr_in as a struct net_sockaddr_in6 and copied the 16-byte sin6_addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy.
With CONFIG_USERSPACE enabled, z_vrfy_zsock_connect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct net_sockaddr_storage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AF_INET6 stream socket, point setsockopt(SO_SOCKS5) at a proxy it controls, and call connect() with a short AF_INET destination to have the kernel send it 12 bytes of supervisor stack residue per attempt. Without CONFIG_USERSPACE the read runs past the end of the caller's own struct net_sockaddr_in, disclosing adjacent memory to the proxy; the family mismatch can arise unintentionally when a destination is obtained from DNS while an IPv6 proxy is configured.
Impact is limited to information disclosure of at most 12 bytes per connect() call, with no write primitive; the leak is delivered to whoever operates the SOCKS5 proxy. The mirrored pairing (IPv6 destination through an IPv4 proxy) is memory-safe but encoded the destination as SOCKS5_ATYP_IPV4 from the first four bytes of the IPv6 address, causing the proxy to connect to an unrelated host. Exploitation requires the non-default CONFIG_SOCKS option, a socket with SO_SOCKS5 configured, and both IPv4 and IPv6 support in the image.
The fix moves the encoding into a helper that selects the address type from dest->sa_family and validates dest_len against the matching struct net_sockaddr_in/struct net_sockaddr_in6 before copying, rejecting under-length or unsupported destinations with an error.
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CVE-2026-95791
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published on November 18, 2026
A vulnerability in the web management and file transfer component of AOS web could allow an authenticated remote attacker to perform arbitrary file reads. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to access sensitive files on the underlying system, potentially exposing configuration data or credentials.
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CVE-2026-95790
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published on November 18, 2026
A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of network device management systems of AOS-8 Mobility Controllers could allow an authenticated remote attacker to bypass authorization controls. Successful exploitation could allow a low-privilege attacker to read sensitive configuration data potentially leading to unauthorized network access and further compromise of network security.
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CVE-2026-95789
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published on November 18, 2026
Command injection vulnerability in the affected interface of AOS-10 or AOS-8 could allow an authenticated remote attacker to perform command injection only on certain impacted devices. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to execute unauthorized arbitrary commands with the privileges of the affected mechanism on the underlying operating system.
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CVE-2026-95788
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published on November 18, 2026
An unauthenticated buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the underlying operating system of AOS-10 or AOS-8 and could allow an unauthenticated adjacent attacker to conduct a denial of service attack. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to disrupt the availability of the affected system, with a limited impact to the integrity of the affected component.
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CVE-2026-95787
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published on November 18, 2026
Vulnerabilities in the PAPI protocol of AOS-10 could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to circumvent existing authentication controls. Successful exploitation could allow an attacker to gain administrative access, modify system configurations, and access or manipulate sensitive data.
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CVE-2026-95690
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published on November 18, 2026
Receiving crafted out-of-sequence DTLS handshake fragments may cause OpenSSL to allocate a full message-length reassembly buffer for each buffered message, so a small amount of wire data consumes a large amount of memory.
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CVE-2026-95645
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published on November 18, 2026
Zohocorp Manageengine DDI Central build below 6500 are affected by a authenticated command injection vulnerability in the Windows DDI Agent's clear_blocked_domains functionality, allowing specially crafted blocked-domain values to trigger arbitrary command execution on Windows systems.
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CVE-2026-95643
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published on November 18, 2026
Zohocorp Manageengine DDI Central build below 6500 are affected by a authenticated PowerShell command injection vulnerability in the Telnet connectivity feature, allowing specially crafted IPv6 scope identifiers to execute arbitrary commands on managed Windows nodes.
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CVE-2026-93673
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published on November 16, 2026
The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx-sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part.
ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c.
The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence.
The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.
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CVE-2026-93672
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published on November 16, 2026
bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan-req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer.
The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first.
The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert.
The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.
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CVE-2026-93671
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published on November 16, 2026
The websocket client's HTTP header callback on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c receives the Sec-WebSocket-Accept header value as a pointer/length pair from the HTTP parser. The referenced bytes live inside the application-supplied receive buffer and are not NUL terminated. When the received value did not match the expected accept key, the pointer was passed directly to a %s conversion in a NET_DBG() call, so the logging code measured the string with strlen() and read on past the end of the header value looking for a terminator.
The value is supplied by the peer during the WebSocket handshake, before any application-level authentication, so a malicious or man-in-the-middle server reached over a ws:// (or otherwise attacker-terminated) connection can trigger the mismatch branch at will simply by answering with a wrong accept key. By sizing the response so the header value ends at the tail of the buffer passed to websocket_connect() as wreq-tmp_buf, the peer can make the scan run off the end of that buffer and into adjacent memory. The defective log statement is compiled in only when websocket debug logging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_WEBSOCKET_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, or CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL=4); it is absent from a default build, which bounds exposure to diagnostic configurations.
The consequence is an out-of-bounds read whose contents are emitted to the log stream: memory adjacent to the receive buffer is disclosed wherever the device's logs are collected or displayed. On targets where the memory following the buffer is not mapped, the scan can instead fault and terminate the connection or thread. No out-of-bounds write occurs, so there is no integrity impact.
The fix copies at most sizeof(got) - 1 bytes of the parser-provided slice into a bounded stack buffer, NUL terminates the copy, and logs that instead, so the formatter never reads beyond the bytes the parser actually offered.
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CVE-2026-93670
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published on November 16, 2026
The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_free_pos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8_t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device()) also stored it in a uint8_t before testing if (pos 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build.
With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data-dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data array and past the end of struct dw_i3c_data; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controller_priv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound.
The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICE_ADDR_TABLE_POINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIG_I3C_DUAL_ROLE with CONFIG_I3C_USE_IBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3c_sec_handoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands.
Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.