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CVE-2026-9034
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published on September 8, 2026
Use After Free vulnerability in Arm Ltd Bifrost GPU Userspace Driver, Arm Ltd Valhall GPU Userspace Driver, Arm Ltd Arm 5th Gen GPU Architecture Userspace Driver allows a non-privileged user process to perform valid GPU processing operations, including via WebGL or WebGPU, to access already freed memory.
This issue affects Bifrost GPU Userspace Driver: from r42p0 through r49p5, from r50p0 through r51p0, from r54p1 through r54p3; Valhall GPU Userspace Driver: from r42p0 through r49p5, from r50p0 through r54p3, r55p0; Arm 5th Gen GPU Architecture Userspace Driver: from r42p0 through r49p5, from r50p0 through r54p3, r55p0.
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CVE-2026-9018
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published on May 22, 2026
The Easy Elements for Elementor – Addons & Website Templates plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.5 via the `easyel_handle_register()` function. This is due to the `wp_ajax_nopriv_eel_register` AJAX handler iterating the attacker-controlled `custom_meta` POST array and writing every supplied key-value pair to the newly created user's meta via `update_user_meta()` without any key whitelist or blocklist, allowing the `wp_capabilities` user meta key to be overwritten after `wp_insert_user()` has already assigned a safe role. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to register a new account with full administrator-level privileges by supplying `custom_meta[wp_capabilities][administrator]=1`. Exploitation requires that user registration is enabled on the site and that at least one page exposes the Login/Register widget, which publishes the required `easy_elements_nonce` into the page DOM where it can be retrieved by any unauthenticated visitor via a simple GET request.
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CVE-2026-9014
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published on May 27, 2026
The WP Promoter plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the reset_stats() function in versions up to, and including, 1.3. The function is hooked to both the wp_ajax_wpp-reset_stats and wp_ajax_nopriv_wpp-reset_stats actions and contains no authentication, authorization, or nonce validation. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to reset the plugin's bar and popup statistics by deleting the wpp_bar and wpp_popup options.
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CVE-2026-9003
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published on May 20, 2026
E-LAN Hybrid Recording System developed by TONNET has a SQL Injection vulnerability, allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to inject arbitrary SQL commands to read database contents.
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CVE-2026-99287
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published on November 10, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xen-netback: Zero out sring pointers on unmap
If xenvif_map_frontend_data_rings() fails when a ring is already mapped,
it unmaps them via xenvif_unmap_frontend_data_rings() which keeps the
ring pointers unchanged. xenvif_connect_data()'s cleanup path calls
xenvif_disconnect_queue() which in turn calls
xenvif_unmap_frontend_data_rings() again, which will attempt to unmap the
pointers a second time.
Zero out the ring pointers after they are unmapped to avoid this issue.
This is XSA-532
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CVE-2026-99271
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published on November 7, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: line6: Clear prev_fbuf on capture buffer release
A KASAN slab-use-after-free read was reported in submit_audio_out_urb()
when generating an impulse test signal:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in create_impulse_test_signal sound/usb/line6/playback.c:76 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in submit_audio_out_urb+0x1848/0x1b20 sound/usb/line6/playback.c:249
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888008d74870 by task syz.2.3214/7785
Allocated by task 11:
kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x2f0/0x390 mm/slub.c:4144
line6_buffer_acquire+0x1a1/0x220 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:158
line6_pcm_acquire+0xb6/0x230 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:329
line6_startup_work+0x3c/0x50 sound/usb/line6/driver.c:728
Freed by task 7785:
kfree+0xf8/0x390 mm/slub.c:6566
line6_buffer_release sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:176 [inline]
line6_buffer_release+0xa5/0xf0 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:170
__line6_pcm_release sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:305 [inline]
line6_pcm_release+0x5a/0x80 sound/usb/line6/pcm.c:313
snd_toneport_monitor_put+0x11b/0x190 sound/usb/line6/toneport.c:183
line6pcm-prev_fbuf points into the capture PCM stream buffer
(line6pcm->in.buffer), which is updated during audio_in_callback() to
feed rate synchronization, software monitoring, and impulse test signal
generation on playback side.
When all capture streams are closed, line6_buffer_release() frees
pstr->buffer with kfree(). However, it does not clear line6pcm->prev_fbuf.
If playback is subsequently started (e.g. via impulse test signal
volume control snd_line6_impulse_volume_put()), submit_audio_out_urb()
dereferences the stale pointer line6pcm->prev_fbuf under in.lock,
resulting in a slab-use-after-free read.
Clear prev_fbuf and prev_fsize in line6_buffer_release() when releasing
the capture stream buffer under in.lock, ensuring that no stale buffer
pointer can be accessed by submit_audio_out_urb().
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CVE-2026-99256
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published on November 3, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm cache: fix issue with background work locking
dm cache used a rw_semaphore for background_work_lock. Write locks on
rw_semaphores have strict owner semantics, but there was no guarantee
that the process that locked background_work_lock was the same process
that unlocked it. This can be easily seen using a kernel compiled with
CONFIG_DEBUG_RWSEMS. Given a dm cache device cache, run: 'dmsetup
suspend && dmsetup resume '. This will trigger a kernel
warning:
DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE))
triggered by cache_resume(). To fix this, switch from a rw_semaphore to
a spinlock and a wait queue. dm cache already has a wait queue and
associated counter, migration_wait and nr_allocated_migrations, that was
getting woken up when background work was getting completed, but wasn't
actually used by anything. This is replaced by the background_work queue
and counter.
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CVE-2026-99242
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix race between fallocate and mmap reads
The fallocate implementation only takes invalidate_lock for punch hole,
collapse range, and insert range operations. For standard allocation modes
(mode == 0, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE), the lock is not held.
During ntfs_attr_fallocate(), new clusters are mapped to the runlist via
ntfs_attr_map_cluster() before being zeroed by ntfs_dio_zero_range(). This
creates a window where concurrent mmap page faults can read uninitialized
disk data.
Since mmap uses filemap_fault() which takes invalidate_lock in shared mode,
it can fault in pages during this window and expose old disk contents to
userspace. This is an information leak and data integrity issue.
Fix by taking invalidate_lock for all fallocate operations, not just for
punch/collapse/insert modes. This prevents concurrent page faults from
accessing unzeroed clusters during the allocation window.
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CVE-2026-99241
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: take invalidate_lock in ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite()
ntfs_filemap_page_mkwrite() calls iomap_page_mkwrite() without holding
mapping-invalidate_lock, so a concurrent truncate or fallocate can be
in the middle of invalidating pagecache and rewriting the runlist while
the write fault maps blocks and dirties the folio. This races with
ntfs_attr_fallocate(), which merges clusters into the in-memory
runlist, drops the runlist lock, and only afterwards zeroes the newly
allocated clusters on disk; and with the punch-hole/insert/collapse
paths that free clusters after truncating the cache.
Per Documentation/filesystems/locking.rst, ->page_mkwrite() must ensure
there are no truncate/invalidate races, "usually mapping->invalidate_lock
is suitable for proper serialization". xfs takes its mmaplock (= the
invalidate_lock rwsem) shared in exactly this path.
Take invalidate_lock shared around iomap_page_mkwrite(). The read-only
fault path is already covered because filemap_fault() itself grabs
invalidate_lock shared on instantiation/read paths; only page_mkwrite
was bypassing it in this driver.
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CVE-2026-99240
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/core: error damos_commit_quota_goal() for zero target_value
Patch series "mm/damon: move zero damos quota target_value handling to the
core layer".
Having zero DAMOS quota target value can cause division by zero. DAMON
API callers are checking the target value parameters to avoid that. It is
easy to make mistakes in some of the multiple API callers. Move that to
the core layer.
Patch 1 adds the corner case handling into the core layer DAMON parameters
validation logic. Patches 2 and 3 remove no more needed DAMON API callers
side handling of the corner case in DAMON_LRU_SORT and DMON_SAMPLIE_MTIER,
respectively.
This patch (of 3):
If a DAMOS scheme has a damos_quota_goal of zero target_value,
damos_quota_goal() could trigger division-by-zero error. Hence each DAMON
API callers should do the zero target_value validation. It is easy to
make mistakes. Actually such bugs in DAMON_LRU_SORT and
DAMON_SAMPLE_MTIER were found and fixed [1].
It is better to handle the corner case only once in the core layer,
instead of multiple places in all DAMON API callers. One straightforward
option is using an alternative denominator for the corner case in the
damos_quota_goal(). However, the zero target_value is meaningless. In
this case, the quota goal is always evaluated as achieved or
over-achieved. The quota will only keep being reduced.
Simply avoid using zero target_value by adding a check in the core layer
DAMOS quota goal parameters validation/commit path,
damos_commit_quota_goal(). Update it to return an error in the case.
Also update its caller to propagate the error.
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CVE-2026-99239
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: refuse __l2cap_chan_add if chan already has conn
l2cap_chan may be linked to l2cap_conn at most once. This is assumed in
several places, eg l2cap_chan_del cleanup.
There is a TOCTOU race where the invariant is violated:
[Task 1] [Task 2]
l2cap_chan_connect l2cap_sock_bind
l2cap_chan_lock lock_sock
l2cap_state_change if (sk-sk_state != BT_OPEN)
chan->state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_state_change_cb chan->state = BT_BOUND
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND
lock_sock ------------------ release_sock
sk->sk_state = BT_CONNECT
l2cap_sock_connect() does not check sk->sk_state, so since chan->state
is now BT_BOUND, subsequent connect() ends up with second
__l2cap_chan_add.
Explicitly document and check the invariant in __l2cap_chan_add with
WARN_ON_ONCE. The only callsite where it could be hit is
l2cap_chan_connect, so add pre-check there to avoid relying on
chan->state. chan->state read/write is not properly guarded currently so
there can be other TOCTOUC problems.
Add l2cap_lock_chan in l2cap_sock_bind() to guard chan->state write.
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CVE-2026-99234
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Unregister field variable histograms when the command fails
An action that names a field on another event needs that field as a
variable, so create_field_var_hist() registers a second hist trigger on
that event to provide it, and records it in
target_hist_data-field_var_hists[].
If a later part of the same command fails, create_actions() returns an
error and event_hist_trigger_parse() jumps to out_free. The write fails
with -EINVAL and sched_switch gets no trigger, but:
# echo 'hist:keys=pid:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs' >> \
events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
# echo 'my_synth u64 lat; int a; int b' >> synthetic_events
# echo 'hist:keys=next_pid:wakeup_lat=common_timestamp.usecs-$ts0:\
onmatch(sched.sched_waking).my_synth($wakeup_lat,prio,nosuchfld)'\
>> events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
# cat events/sched/sched_waking/trigger
hist:keys=pid:vals=hitcount:ts0=common_timestamp.usecs:sort=hitcount:size=2048:clock=global [active]
hist:keys=pid:vals=hitcount:synthetic_prio=prio:sort=hitcount:size=2048 [active]
The second histogram is the one created for 'prio'. It is still active and
still counting.
out_free reaches destroy_field_var_hists(), which frees the
field_var_hists[] entries, but never unregister_field_var_hists(), which is
what removes the triggers and runs only from event_hist_trigger_free(). The
entry is freed and the trigger is left with nothing tracking it.
Unregister the field variable histograms in out_free as well, and record
each one as soon as its trigger is registered rather than after the lookup
that follows it, so no exit can leave a registered trigger untracked. The
entry then belongs to field_var_hists[] and is released by
destroy_field_var_hists(), so freeing it on that exit would be a double
free.
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CVE-2026-99231
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/waitid: own the request before clearing -head
io_waitid_remove_wq() only takes the wait queue lock if ->head is set.
io_waitid_wait() clears ->head first thing, before it tries to become the
owner of the request by bumping ->refs. If somebody else owns the request
at that point, nothing keeps it from completing the request while the
wake up handler is still going to touch it:
CPU0 (io_waitid_wait) CPU1 (io_waitid, holds a ref)
list_del_init(&wait->entry)
smp_store_release(&iw->head, NULL)
__do_wait() finds another child
io_waitid_remove_wq()
// ->head == NULL, no locking
io_waitid_finish(), IOU_COMPLETE
// request freed and reused
atomic_fetch_inc(&iw->refs)
The same goes for __io_waitid_cancel() if it claims the request in that
window. ->refs is part of the per opcode data of the request, so this
increments whatever the next user of the request keeps there. If that
happens to be zero, the handler concludes that it owns the request, and
queues io_waitid_cb() for it. With the window held open by a delay, and
the request reused for a receive that is waiting for data:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __wake_up_common+0x1ca/0x1f0
__wake_up_sync_key+0x36/0x50
sock_def_readable+0xf1/0x420
unix_stream_sendmsg+0x60b/0x1110
Allocated by task 87:
io_arm_apoll+0x1ed/0x940
Freed by task 87:
__io_submit_flush_completions+0x118d/0x1a10
tctx_task_work_run+0x327/0x950
Only clear ->head once the handler owns the request. If it doesn't, the
owner finds ->head set and has to wait for the lock, which is held by the
caller of the handler. Deleting the already deleted entry again is
harmless.
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CVE-2026-99229
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/wait: don't spin on a stuck overflow list
As long as IO_CHECK_CQ_OVERFLOW_BIT is set, io_cqring_wait_schedule()
returns right away, before it gets to look at signals or arms the timeout,
for io_cqring_wait() to flush the overflow list. If that doesn't empty the
list, and the CQ ring doesn't hold the number of events the caller wants,
the loop starts over, with the same result. The task spins in the kernel,
and can't be killed.
The assumption is that this can't happen: if CQEs can't be flushed, the
ring is full, and min_events is capped to the size of the ring. But:
- With IORING_SETUP_CQE_MIXED a 32b CQE needs two contiguous entries. It
is stuck on the list if a single one is free, and then the ring holds
less than cq_entries events. A single threaded application that asks
for as many events as the ring has entries never gets out of
io_uring_enter().
- Whether the ring is full is up to the CQ head, which the application
can write to. While one thread waits for events on an empty ring,
another one can move the head back so that the ring looks full and
have a CQE overflow. The waiter can't be stopped any more, not even by
SIGKILL.
Only the application can make room in the CQ ring. Return to it if the
list could not be flushed.
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CVE-2026-99228
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: don't lose the signal that ends work
When a thread exits, only its tracked requests are cancelled. Then its
io-wq is torn down. io_wq_exit_workers() signals every worker, to get it
out of an interruptible sleep, and waits for all of them to exit. Before
they do, they go through the work that is left. Unbounded work is
cancelled. Bounded work is run, as it is expected to end by itself.
Not all of it does. An open has no file yet, so it counts as bounded, and
the open of a FIFO waits for the other end. That is what the signal is for.
But the workers are signalled once, and a worker that hasn't started the
work by then loses the signal:
io_wq_exit_workers() io_worker_handle_work()
io_wq_worker_wake()
set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
io_assign_current_work()
io_run_task_work()
clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
io_wq_submit_work()
fifo_open()
wait_for_partner()
wait_for_completion_timeout()
The thread never gets out of do_exit():
IORING_OP_OPENAT of a FIFO without a writer, IOSQE_ASYNC
exit of the thread that has submitted it
hangs in more than 9 of 10 attempts (4 CPUs, KVM), until the process is
killed.
Set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL for bounded work that is started with IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
set. The bit is set before the workers are signalled, and it is tested
after the flag has been cleared, with clear_notify_signal() providing the
barrier. So either the flag stays, or the bit is seen.
Work that is started while the io-wq exits is treated like work that is
being run at that time: it isn't interrupted unless it waits
interruptibly.
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CVE-2026-99220
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published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs
The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
Call Trace:
TASK
__key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
__do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.
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CVE-2026-99216
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published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: Don't reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths
In two places, current code forces vmbus_connection.conn_state to
DISCONNECTED prior to calling vmbus_disconnect(). But vmbus_disconnect()
calls vmbus_initiate_unload(), which unloads the VMBus connection
only if the conn_state is CONNECTED. Consequently, the connection
remains and the Hyper-V host might continue to send messages or post
VMBus interrupts.
The problem was introduced in commit 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V:
Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback"), in that
vmbus_initiate_unload() started checking the current connection
state before doing the unload. This commit removed some occurrences
where conn_state was forced to DISCONNECTED, but these two remained,
apparently due to an oversight at the time.
Fix this by not forcing conn_state to DISCONNECTED during VMBus exit,
or if a failure occurs when establishing the connection in the first
place. Whatever value conn_state has at the time is then read by
vmbus_initiate_unload() to determine if there is a connection to
be unloaded.
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CVE-2026-99213
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established
Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED - TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can
race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on
ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what
happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events
that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already
set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it.
Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending().
Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to
memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs,
and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table.
list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130
Call Trace:
vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460
vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480
process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560
worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60
kthread+0x36e/0x470
ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore
signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link.
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CVE-2026-99209
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: skip eviction of a BO with no resource
xe_evict_flags() switches on tbo-resource->mem_type to choose an
eviction placement. An xe BO can reach eviction with no ttm.resource,
e.g. an imported dma-buf BO whose resource was freed during teardown
while its attachment is still live: the exporter then invalidates it via
xe_dma_buf_move_notify() -> xe_bo_evict(), and the switch dereferences a
NULL resource and faults.
A BO with no resource has nothing placed or mapped, so there is nothing
to evict. Return an empty placement (num_placement = 0), mirroring the
handling already used for non-xe scatter-gather BOs just above;
ttm_bo_validate() then takes the pipeline-gutting path and returns 0.
Without the fix the xe_dma_buf@xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource
dynamic live selftest will fail with below stack.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: 0010:xe_evict_flags+0xf4/0x140 [xe]
Call Trace:
TASK>
xe_bo_evict+0x40/0xa0 [xe]
? ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting+0x71/0x180 [ttm]
xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource+0x182/0x440 [xe]
xe_dma_buf_kunit+0x387/0x580 [xe]
v2: Add Fixes tag and failure info in commit text (Matt Brost)
(cherry picked from commit dbcfaac6331f1fcb0c2fe3ad3e9adb1e5d43ec0c)
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CVE-2026-99208
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Zero OA buffer at allocation
ttm_bo_type_kernel BOs are not guaranteed to be zeroed on allocation and
may contain data from previously freed pages. Since the OA buffer is
mmap'able by userspace, this can expose stale kernel memory contents.
Streams opened with DRM_XE_OA_PROPERTY_OA_DISABLED allocate the OA
buffer without calling xe_oa_init_oa_buffer(). Zero the buffer at
allocation to prevent information disclosure through mmap.
The existing zeroing in xe_oa_init_oa_buffer() remains necessary for
zero report-id/timestamp detection on enable/re-enable.
(cherry picked from commit 126c4c5388f9311a390b9b254a835b0cf0f55331)