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CVE-2026-98675
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: ade9000: handle Phase C dip events in IRQ1 handler
ADE9000_ST1_CROSSING_DEPTH is the exclusive upper bound for scanning the
STATUS1 event bits, so a value of 25 left out the highest event bit,
ADE9000_ST1_DIPC_BIT (bit 25). Phase C dip events were never reported.
Bump the value to 26 so bit 25 is scanned.
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CVE-2026-98670
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: adc: xilinx-xadc: free IRQ before cancelling the unmask worker on unbind
The ZYNQ XADC alarm IRQ handler queues zynq_unmask_work via
schedule_delayed_work(); that work is cleared by a devm callback.
Register the devm callback before devm_request_irq() so the devres LIFO
teardown frees the IRQ first, ensuring the handler can no longer queue
work by the time the workqueue is cleared. Otherwise the handler could
re-arm the work and run it after the xadc structure has been freed.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.
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CVE-2026-98667
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: frequency: adf4377: Fully initialize clk_init_data and clk_parent_data
The clk_init_data structure contains several mutually-exclusive members
for different methods to specify the possible parents of a clock,
prompting drivers to initialize only the members they need. However,
not initializing all members may cause subtle issues, which are only
exposed when CONFIG_INIT_STACK_ALL_PATTERN or CONFIG_INIT_STACK_NONE is
enabled.
adf4377_clk_register() fills in init.parent_data, and assumes that
init.parent_names is NULL. However, the latter is uninitialized, and
thus may cause a crash.
Similarly, adf4377_clk_register() fills in only parent_data.fw_name,
leaving other members of the clk_parent_data structure uninitialized.
Make sure all members are fully initialized, to fix such bugs, and to
avoid future breakage when converting drivers to a different method for
specifying the parents.
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CVE-2026-98666
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: gyro: adis16136: fix unprotected debugfs reads
The serial_number file operations are open coded and never call
debugfs_file_get(), which debugfs_create_file_unsafe() requires.
debugfs_remove_recursive() therefore does not wait for a read in
progress, and unbind frees the iio_dev underneath it.
Use debugfs_create_file() instead.
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CVE-2026-98659
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published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: pressure: rohm-bm1390: Return error when read fails
The data reading function ignores the cached error value, and
unconditionally returns 0. Return cached 'ret' -value after stopping
the measurement so user knows if read failed and data is garbage.
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CVE-2026-98657
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: proximity: pulsedlight: fix iio_device left registered on PM setup failure
pm_runtime_set_active() failing in probe() jumps to error_unreg_buffer,
which only calls iio_triggered_buffer_cleanup() -- it does not undo the
iio_device_register() that already succeeded a few lines above. probe()
then returns the error, the devm-managed indio_dev is freed, but the
iio core still has it registered: the sysfs/chardev nodes stay live and
point at freed memory.
Add an error_unreg_dev label that unregisters the iio device before
falling through to the existing buffer cleanup, mirroring the teardown
order already used in lidar_remove().
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CVE-2026-98649
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: s390: Fix race in _destroy_pages_crste()
Use READ_ONCE() in _destroy_pages_crste() to read the crste, avoid
dereferencing the pointer multiple times.
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CVE-2026-98647
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix divide-by-zero in btf_struct_walk()
When an access goes past the struct and the last member is a flexible
array, btf_struct_walk() folds the offset back into a single element with
(off - moff) % t-size, but never checks that the element type has a size.
BTF takes an empty struct, so this in program BTF
/* event could be empty */
struct event {
#ifdef HAVE_TIMESTAMP
__u64 ts;
#endif
};
struct batch {
int nr;
struct event events[];
};
divides by zero at prog load time. Getting there needs a PTR_TO_BTF_ID that
is not MEM_ALLOC, e.g. a plain read of a local kptr stashed in a map from a
sleepable program.
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
RIP: 0010:btf_struct_walk+0x53f/0x1570
Call Trace:
TASK>
btf_struct_access+0x42a/0xcd0
check_ptr_to_btf_access+0x4dc/0x1160
check_mem_access+0x3a45/0x8740
check_load_mem+0x36a/0xd10
do_check_common+0x3ef0/0xb210
bpf_check+0x6d3b/0x8580
bpf_prog_load+0xf7c/0x2720
__sys_bpf+0xa83/0x3690
__x64_sys_bpf+0xc7/0x150
x64_sys_call+0x1f3f/0x27e0
do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Reject a zero-sized element type. The fixed array path in the same function
already bails out on the same thing:
btf_struct_walk()
...
/* skip empty array */
if (moff == mtrue_end)
continue;
msize /= total_nelems;
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CVE-2026-98645
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: winwing: fix use-after-free in force feedback teardown
winwing_init_ff() passes the driver's private data, allocated with
devm_kzalloc() in winwing_probe(), as the effect context to
input_ff_create_memless(). The memoryless force-feedback core takes
ownership of that pointer and frees it with kfree() from
input_ff_destroy() (ml_ff_destroy()) when the input device is
destroyed.
Freeing a devm-managed allocation with kfree() is an invalid free, and
the same object is then released again by devres when the HID device is
torn down, a double free. As the allocation also embeds the LED class
devices, their timers and work item live on freed memory and the slab
gets corrupted. This triggers on unbind, rmmod, hot-unplug and on system
suspend, where the firmware cache walks the now-corrupt devres list.
KASAN reports:
BUG: KASAN: invalid-free in input_ff_destroy
Allocated by task N:
winwing_probe
Pass NULL as the memless context instead and fetch the driver data from
the input device in winwing_play_effect(): the HID core already stores
the hid_device as the input device's drvdata. The force-feedback core
then owns nothing that it must not free.
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CVE-2026-98644
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Avoid soft lockup in __htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch()
__htab_map_lookup_and_delete_batch() has no rescheduling point. The
batch count bounds how many entries are copied out, not how many
buckets are visited, so one BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_BATCH call can walk the
map end to end. The empty-bucket fast path is worse: it stays inside
a single rcu_read_lock() / bpf_disable_instrumentation() section for
any run of consecutive empty buckets.
That holds up on small maps, but it falls apart at scale. On a
144-CPU arm64 host running a CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE kernel, periodic
BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_BATCH calls against an LRU hash map with 16,777,216
buckets held a CPU inside the batch op for 77+ seconds and triggered
the soft lockup watchdog.
Commit 75134f16e7dd ("bpf: Add schedule points in batch ops") fixed this
same problem in the generic batch ops, but not in this htab-native path,
which every htab-based hash map variant uses for its lookup[_and_delete]
batch ops.
Complete that fix here. Leave the critical section after 64 consecutive
empty buckets, call cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs(), and resume at the saved
bucket cursor. No locks are held at that point, and resuming from the
cursor is already the function's behavior for non-empty buckets. Add the
same call to the per-bucket loop after copy_to_user(), where every lock
has been dropped. cond_resched_rcu() is not enough here: sleeping with
bpf_prog_active elevated makes tracing programs on that CPU silently
skip their invocations.
Plain cond_resched() is not enough either. It is a no-op under PREEMPT
and PREEMPT_LAZY, the only models arm64 and x86 have offered since
commit 7dadeaa6e851 ("sched: Further restrict the preemption modes").
It is also never a Tasks RCU quiescent state, in any model: the
reschedule counts as a preemption. The walking task stays a holdout and
stalls every synchronize_rcu_tasks() caller, ftrace and BPF trampoline
teardown included, until the syscall returns [1].
cond_resched_tasks_rcu_qs() is the usual tool for that [2]. It reports
the quiescent state at each yield and still reschedules as
cond_resched() does on PREEMPT_NONE and PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY kernels.
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CVE-2026-98643
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops
A sockops prog reading skops-rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the
tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the
ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of
the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory.
SEC("sockops")
int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops)
{
switch (skops->op) {
case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT:
leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */
...
}
}
For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a
leaked kernel pointer.
Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks
is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full
socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is
the only one open-coded, so it skips the check.
Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special:
it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass
rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset
offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t)
(s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get()
returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is
added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset
are no longer needed.
Before patch:
0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v
After patch:
0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9
1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock
2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0
3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk
5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v
6: goto pc+2
7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56)
8: r1 = 0
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CVE-2026-98642
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix UAF due to concurrent consumption of ttrace lists in alloc_bulk
Syzkaller repeatedly triggered UAF splats related to nodes in
waiting_for_gp_ttrace within the bpf memalloc:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881572cd080 by task syz.4.470/5112
...
llist_del_first+0x85/0x110 lib/llist.c:61
alloc_bulk+0x193/0x460 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:229
bpf_mem_refill+0x386/0x560 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:436
Freed by task 14:
...
__free_rcu kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:281 [inline]
__free_rcu_tasks_trace+0x48/0xd0 kernel/bpf/memalloc.c:291
rcu_tasks_invoke_cbs+0x1ec/0x3e0 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:571
rcu_tasks_one_gp+0x13d/0x220 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:621
rcu_tasks_kthread+0xf3/0x120 kernel/rcu/tasks.h:651
The reason is that the UAF occurs after the RCU Tasks Trace GP expires:
when the __free_rcu() callback runs, there is no synchronization
protecting llist_del_all() against concurrent alloc_bulk() operating on
waiting_for_gp_ttrace, leading to the race condition below:
CPU0 CPU1
__free_rcu (RCU Tasks Trace callback)
alloc_bulk
llist_del_first(&c-waiting_for_gp_ttrace)
entry = smp_load_acquire(&head->first);
do {
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
free_all(llist_del_all(&c->waiting_for_gp_ttrace))
llist_for_each_safe(pos, t, llnode)
free_one(pos);
next = READ_ONCE(entry->next); -- trigger UAF
} while (!try_cmpxchg(&head->first, &entry, next));
In addition, there is also a theoretical race condition on the
free_by_rcu_ttrace list. This race requires two preconditions: an
in-flight Tasks Trace GP keeping c->call_rcu_ttrace_in_progress == 1,
and concurrent cross-CPU frees repopulating c->free_by_rcu_ttrace with
new nodes. Under these conditions, the following scenario triggers UAF:
// CPU0
// irq work is still busy (on PREEMPT_RT)
alloc_bulk()
llist_del_first(&c->free_by_rcu_ttrace)
entry = smp_load_acquire(&head->first);
do {
if (entry == NULL)
return NULL;
// CPU1
bpf_mem_alloc_destroy()
WRITE_ONCE(c->draining, true)
// wait for CPU0
irq_work_sync()
// CPU2
do_call_rcu_ttrace(tgt(CPU0))
if (c->draining) {
llist_del_all(&c->free_by_rcu_ttrace)
free_all()
}
// CPU0 continue
next = READ_ONCE(entry->next); <-- trigger UAF
while (!try_cmpxchg(&head->first, &entry, next));
Fix this by introducing a raw spinlock to synchronize the concurrent
consumption on waiting_for_gp_ttrace and free_by_rcu_ttrace.
-
CVE-2026-98627
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Preserve packet pointer class displacement in regsafe()
regsafe() maps packet pointer IDs between states and checks that each
current register range is a subset of the corresponding explored
register range. It does not, however, preserve the displacement between
registers that share a packet pointer ID.
This is unsound because packet range is shared by ID. A bounds check on
one class member updates every member, and a later access can consume the
range through another member. Commit 022ac0750883 ("bpf: use reg-var_off
instead of reg->off for pointers") folded the fixed pointer offset into
r64 and removed the old off equality check, so two individually narrower
registers can prune even when their displacement has changed. The
explored path can then license an out-of-bounds packet access on the
pruned path.
Require matching range bases for packet pointers with an ID. Together
with the existing ID mapping, this preserves the displacement between
members of each packet-pointer class without adding per-ID state.
Packet pointers without an ID remain unaffected.
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CVE-2026-98619
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethtool: keep rtnl_lock for the ioctl self test
An offline self test that brings the interface down and back up with
netif_close() / netif_open() requires rtnl_lock for both. Since the
ethtool IOCTL path became rtnl-optional for ops-locked drivers, the
ETHTOOL_TEST ioctl runs holding only the netdev instance lock, so on an
ops-locked driver the self test now tears the device down without
rtnl_lock.
With lockdep this reproduces deterministically on every offline self
test on such a driver; note the sole lock held is the instance lock, not
rtnl:
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
net/core/netpoll.c:207 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage!
1 lock held by ethtool/107:
#0: (&dev-lock){+.+.}, at: dev_ethtool
Call Trace:
netpoll_poll_disable
__dev_close_many
netif_close_many
netif_close
fbnic_self_test
dev_ethtool_locked
dev_ethtool
dev_ioctl
sock_ioctl
__x64_sys_ioctl
Without lockdep the same condition trips ASSERT_RTNL() in
__dev_close_many() / __dev_open(); that check only samples the global
rtnl state, so it can be masked by a concurrent rtnl holder, but the
device is still being reconfigured without the lock it requires.
The ethtool self_test is a legacy ioctl-only command, so an ETHTOOL_TEST
case is only needed on the ioctl path. Add an opt-in bit for drivers whose
self test needs rtnl_lock and set it on the ops-locked drivers whose
offline self test tears the interface down and up:
- fbnic (ops-locked via queue_mgmt_ops): fbnic_self_test() offline path
uses netif_close() / netif_open().
- bnxt (ops-locked via queue_mgmt_ops): bnxt_self_test() offline path
goes through bnxt_close_nic() / bnxt_half_open_nic() /
bnxt_half_close_nic() / bnxt_open_nic(), which close and reopen the
device.
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CVE-2026-98617
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: use the Rx queue napi pointer to find the napi vector
The queue management ndos pick the napi vector for an Rx queue with:
nv = fbn-napi[idx % fbn->num_napi];
The issue is this is only correct in the cases where there are no
standalone Tx vectors. In those cases we were allocating the Tx vectors
first and then the Rx so the queues would be pointing to Tx NAPI vectors
instead of the Rx ones.
The mapping the ndos want is already recorded. fbnic_set_netif_napi()
publishes it with netif_queue_set_napi(), which stores the napi pointer
in netdev_rx_queue.napi, and fbnic_reset_netif_napi() clears it again.
Both run under the netdev instance lock that the queue management ndos
also hold, so the pointer can be read directly.
Use it and drop the divide. The pointer is NULL exactly while the
datapath is down, so fbnic_queue_mem_alloc() can reject that case rather
than reaching into freed state: netdev_rx_queue_restart() calls it
before it tests netif_running(), and fbnic_pm_suspend() leaves
netif_running() true across a PCIe recovery that never completes, so a
queue restart can arrive after fbnic_stop() has freed the rings and the
vectors. fbnic_stop() clears the association in
fbnic_reset_netif_queues() before fbnic_free_napi_vectors(), so the
NULL is always published first. fbnic_queue_start() and
fbnic_queue_stop() need no check of their own, as
netdev_rx_queue_reconfig() only reaches them once fbnic_queue_mem_alloc()
has succeeded under the same instance lock.
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CVE-2026-98616
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: reset num_napi when the napi vectors are freed
fbn-num_napi is the count of live napi vectors, each of which owns an
IRQ. The PM path had freed them without clearing the count.
fbnic_pm_suspend() tears the datapath down via ndo_stop() and frees the
IRQs, but leaves netif_running() true so resume knows to re-open. Resume
rebuilds the datapath in __fbnic_pm_resume() and fbnic_reset_queues() sets
num_napi and __fbnic_open() re-allocates the vectors.
When the datapath is torn down but never rebuilt, num_napi is left
pointing at freed vectors under 2 different scenarios:
- a PCIe error recovery that fails (fbnic_err_slot_reset() ->
__fbnic_pm_resume() returns an error -> PCI_ERS_RESULT_DISCONNECT), so
.resume never runs; or
- an __fbnic_open() that fails partway on resume and unwinds, freeing
the vectors after fbnic_reset_queues() has already set num_napi.
The netdev is then running with num_napi > 0 but napi[] freed, and the
eventual remove/unbind close re-enters fbnic_down() -> fbnic_dbg_down()
and dereferences the freed vectors:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000210
RIP: fbnic_dbg_down+0x28
Clear num_napi when the vectors are freed: in the suspend teardown (a
good resume re-establishes it before __fbnic_open()) and on the resume
open failure. A redundant ndo_stop() then walks an empty napi[]. The
normal ndo_stop() down/up cycle is untouched and keeps num_napi for the
next ndo_open().
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CVE-2026-98614
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: avoid livelock while updating retransmit path
sctp_assoc_update_retran_path() can loop forever when every remaining
transport, including retran_path, is SCTP_UNCONFIRMED: the state check
runs before the wraparound test, so the loop cannot observe that it has
completed a full pass.
Fix this by considering a transport only when it is not UNCONFIRMED,
then checking whether the walk has returned to retran_path. This makes
the full-pass termination independent of the transport state while
preserving the existing fallback selection semantics.
Also restore the NULL guard around the retran_path assignment. In the
all-UNCONFIRMED case there is no eligible replacement transport, and
installing NULL would leave later retransmit-path users and the debug
print with a NULL path.
-
CVE-2026-98612
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: bound the RX packet length in catc_rx_done()
catc_rx_done() walks a multi-packet URB, reading a two-byte length from
each packet header. Its bound, pkt_len urb->actual_length, ignores the
header offset and compares against the whole transfer rather than the
bytes left from pkt_start, so a crafted packet header makes
skb_copy_to_linear_data() read past the buffer.
A length below ETH_HLEN is also accepted, including zero, and
eth_type_trans() then reads a MAC header from the uninitialised tailroom
of a shorter skb. The is_f5u011 branch takes its length straight from
the transfer, so a zero-length URB reaches the same path.
Track the bytes remaining from the current packet, and reject a header
that does not fit, a length past what is left, and a length below an
Ethernet header.
A transfer shorter than an Ethernet header, including a zero-length one,
previously became a runt skb passed to netif_rx() and counted as
received; it is now counted in rx_length_errors and ends the walk.
-
CVE-2026-98607
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/virtio: fix object leaks in virtio_gpu_resource_create_blob_ioctl()
virtio_gpu_resource_create_blob_ioctl() calls drm_gem_object_release() on
both the virtio_gpu_resource_assign_uuid() and drm_gem_handle_create()
error paths instead of dropping the reference it owns, so
obj-funcs->free() never runs and the virtio_gpu_object, the resource id
and the host-side resource are leaked.
Use drm_gem_object_put() instead.
-
CVE-2026-98603
•
published on October 18, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovpn: replace bind when clearing stale local source
The UDP output fallback clears bind-local in place when the remembered
source address is no longer usable. The bind is RCU-published and read
locklessly by concurrent TX, so an IPv6 reader can observe a torn
address.
Retry the route lookup with source address autoselection without
modifying the bind. After a successful lookup, revalidate the bind and
route key under peer->lock, reset the dst cache, and best-effort publish
a replacement bind with a wildcard local address.
Do not cache the resolved dst when clearing the local source. Replacing
the source invalidates all per-CPU cache entries, while
dst_cache_set_ip4 and dst_cache_set_ip6 update only the current CPU
slot. The current packet can still use the resolved route; if bind
allocation fails, a later cache miss retries the repair.