-
CVE-2026-99228
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/io-wq: don't lose the signal that ends work
When a thread exits, only its tracked requests are cancelled. Then its
io-wq is torn down. io_wq_exit_workers() signals every worker, to get it
out of an interruptible sleep, and waits for all of them to exit. Before
they do, they go through the work that is left. Unbounded work is
cancelled. Bounded work is run, as it is expected to end by itself.
Not all of it does. An open has no file yet, so it counts as bounded, and
the open of a FIFO waits for the other end. That is what the signal is for.
But the workers are signalled once, and a worker that hasn't started the
work by then loses the signal:
io_wq_exit_workers() io_worker_handle_work()
io_wq_worker_wake()
set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
io_assign_current_work()
io_run_task_work()
clear TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL
io_wq_submit_work()
fifo_open()
wait_for_partner()
wait_for_completion_timeout()
The thread never gets out of do_exit():
IORING_OP_OPENAT of a FIFO without a writer, IOSQE_ASYNC
exit of the thread that has submitted it
hangs in more than 9 of 10 attempts (4 CPUs, KVM), until the process is
killed.
Set TIF_NOTIFY_SIGNAL for bounded work that is started with IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
set. The bit is set before the workers are signalled, and it is tested
after the flag has been cleared, with clear_notify_signal() providing the
barrier. So either the flag stays, or the bit is seen.
Work that is started while the io-wq exits is treated like work that is
being run at that time: it isn't interrupted unless it waits
interruptibly.
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CVE-2026-99227
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/waitid: prevent cancel reference wrap
io_waitid packs the cancellation state into bit 31 of -refs and uses
bits 30:0 as a 31-bit reference counter:
#define IO_WAITID_CANCEL_FLAG BIT(31)
#define IO_WAITID_REF_MASK GENMASK(30, 0)
__io_waitid_cancel() marks a request canceled, then increments the low
bits of ->refs to claim completion ownership. When another path owns the
request, the increment remains even though cancellation returns false.
The request remains discoverable by cancellation, so repeated failed
attempts can wrap the 31-bit reference field to zero. A later
cancellation can claim ownership and complete the request a second time.
Use atomic_fetch_or() when setting the cancel flag and inspect the old
flag value. The first cancel attempt continues to the existing ownership
increment, preserving its wake and issuer handoff semantics. Later
attempts see the cancel flag and return without incrementing the
reference field.
This makes repeated failed cancellation attempts idempotent while
leaving the first-cancel state transitions unchanged.
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CVE-2026-99226
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Avoid the owner account dereference in named keyring lookup
Named keyring lookup must keep the storage containing the owner UID
alive through the namespace mapping check. find_keyring_by_name()
reads keyring-user->uid under keyring_name_lock, but that lock protects
the keyring's name entry and allocation, not its separate key_user.
A named session-keyring join can overlap a privileged KEYCTL_CHOWN on
another CPU. If the keyring holds the last reference to its old dynamic
key_user and the ownership transfer succeeds, the following ordering is
possible:
Named join Chown
find_keyring_by_name() keyctl_chown_key()
read_lock(keyring_name_lock) down_write(key->sem)
load old keyring->user
replace key->user and key->uid
up_write(key->sem)
key_put(key)
key_user_put(old user): free
read old user->uid
read_unlock(keyring_name_lock)
Chown neither takes keyring_name_lock nor key_session_mutex, so it can
free the old account between the pointer load and the UID read. The
lookup then reads freed memory even though the keyring itself is alive.
Use keyring->uid for the mapping check. key_alloc() initializes this
inline owner UID and keyctl_chown_key() updates it on chown.
The existing name lock keeps its containing keyring allocated throughout
the check, so lookup no longer depends on the account's lifetime. This
also matches the owner UID used by the permission check.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in find_keyring_by_name+0x577/0x5d0
Read of size 4 at addr ffff8881128ae2ec by task keycase/500
-
CVE-2026-99225
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Check the authorization payload in process keyring searches
An authorization payload and its saved credentials must remain valid
while search_process_keyrings_rcu() searches the requestor's keyrings.
The function validates the authorization key, then separately loads
payload.data[0] and unconditionally reads rka-cred. Validation does
not prevent request_key_auth_revoke() from clearing the payload.
A request-key helper can assume authority and fork a descendant that
inherits the authorization key. If the descendant misses in its own
keyrings, it falls back to the saved requestor credentials. Successful
target instantiation invalidates the authorization key without clearing
the payload. After the helper exits, UMH_WAIT_PROC returns to the
requester, which calls complete_request_key() and revokes that key.
With the descendant paused after validation, the paths can interleave
as follows:
1. The descendant enters search_process_keyrings_rcu() under RCU and
key_validate() succeeds.
2. The helper instantiates the target, invalidates the authorization
key, and exits.
3. The requester resumes from UMH_WAIT_PROC, calls
complete_request_key(), and revokes the authorization key.
request_key_auth_revoke() sets its payload pointer to NULL.
4. The descendant loads NULL and dereferences rka->cred.
This NULL dereference can oops the kernel. RCU delays payload disposal
but does not prevent the pointer from being cleared.
Load the payload with dereference_key_rcu() and require a non-NULL
result before validating the authorization key and searching its saved
credentials. A non-NULL payload and its credentials remain alive for
the caller's RCU read-side section; a cleared payload skips the fallback
search and follows the existing error selection.
KASAN report as below:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000005: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f]
RIP: 0010:search_process_keyrings_rcu+0x32b/0x790
-
CVE-2026-99224
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Protect the type name while describing a key
keyctl_describe_key() must keep the key type's name alive until
kasprintf() has consumed it. The retained key reference keeps the key
and its description alive, but does not pin the module providing its
type. The name is passed to kasprintf() without holding key-sem.
kvasprintf() uses the saved name pointer in two formatting passes, with
a GFP_KERNEL allocation between them. With AF_RXRPC=m, a task that
passes View permission before type retirement can overlap a privileged
module unload in this order:
1. KEYCTL_DESCRIBE looks up the key, saves key->type->name in the
kasprintf() arguments and completes the first formatting pass.
2. While the formatter is delayed before its second pass,
af_rxrpc_exit() calls unregister_key_type(), which removes the type
from the registry and waits for key_gc_keytype().
3. The collector takes key->sem for writing, retypes the retained key
to key_type_dead and completes retirement. Unregistration and module
exit return, allowing free_module() to release the type and name.
4. The formatter resumes its second pass and reads the saved name from
released module storage, which can fault in string().
Hold key->sem for reading across kasprintf(). The collector then cannot
retype the key or complete retirement until both formatting passes have
finished. If retirement wins the lock first, formatting uses the core
key_type_dead name instead. Release the semaphore immediately after
kasprintf(), including on allocation failure, before copying to
userspace.
Oops report as below:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff8054794
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
RIP: 0010:string+0x23f/0x470
Call Trace:
vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110
-
CVE-2026-99223
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: make keyring indexes independent of kernel addresses
KEYCTL_READ returns the serial numbers in a keyring in associative-array
traversal order. The first word of the index is a public, deterministic
hash of the type pointer, domain pointer and description. An unprivileged
user can therefore insert keys with known descriptions, predict their
order for each possible KASLR slide, and recover the kernel image address.
On an x86-64 build with 16 MiB alignment, 45 user keys suffice to
distinguish the candidate slides.
Remove the addresses from the whole index, not just its first hash word.
Assign each key type and domain a nonzero 64-bit ID and hash those IDs and
the description with a once-initialized SipHash key. Use the full IDs in
the later index chunks as well. Truncating or hashing the IDs there would
lose the guarantee that distinct type/domain/description tuples have a
differing index bit.
Allocate IDs lazily since private key types need not be registered. Cache
them in the index key so tree walks and copies of an existing index do not
need to dereference a type descriptor that may have been unregistered.
Keep the 32-bit chunk layout and diff_objects() bit offsets consistent,
and retain the separate root slot for keyrings used by recursive search.
The key comparison, permissions and userspace data format are unchanged;
only the address-dependent in-memory ordering is replaced.
-
CVE-2026-99222
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys: Protect the read method check against type removal
keyctl_read_key() checks key-type->read without holding key->sem.
A reference keeps the key alive, but does not pin the module containing
its type. A surviving RxRPC key can therefore be read while AF_RXRPC
is being unloaded:
KEYCTL_READ task Module unload and key GC
---------------- ------------------------
lookup_user_key()
permission / possession checks
load key->type
af_rxrpc_exit()
unregister_key_type()
GC: down_write(key->sem)
GC: retype to key_type_dead
GC: up_write(key->sem)
unregister_key_type() returns
free_module()
read saved type's read member
The final access can read freed module storage. The read invocation in
__keyctl_read_key() is already protected by key->sem, but the earlier
method check is outside that critical section.
Move the method check into __keyctl_read_key(), after key_validate() and
under its existing read hold on key->sem. The check and invocation then
use the same protected type for length queries and every read retry.
The GC cannot retype the key until the semaphore is released, and type
unregistration waits for that GC pass before the module can be freed.
Return -EOPNOTSUPP when validation succeeds and the type has no read
method. A temporary buffer may now be allocated before this result;
allocation and copying to userspace remain outside the semaphore.
-
CVE-2026-99221
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
keys/trusted_keys: return immediately after TPM unseal failure
trusted_tpm_unseal() proceeds to pcrlock() when the TPM unseal operation
fails. If pcrlock() succeeds, its return value overwrites the unseal error,
causing key instantiation to succeed.
Return immediately when unseal fails to preserve the original error.
-
CVE-2026-99220
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
asymmetric_keys: reject trust keys without IDs
The PKCS#8 parser deliberately leaves the asym_key_ids payload slot
empty. key_or_keyring_common() unconditionally dereferences that slot
when a PKCS#8 key is supplied to a key_or_keyring restriction. Both the
plain and :chain forms reach this branch, allowing an unprivileged caller
to trigger a NULL pointer dereference through KEYCTL_RESTRICT_KEYRING
followed by add_key().
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
RIP: 0010:key_or_keyring_common (crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:205 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c:279)
Call Trace:
TASK
__key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:884)
key_create_or_update (security/keys/key.c:1021)
__do_sys_add_key (security/keys/keyctl.c:134)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:130)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Reject an asymmetric restriction key without key IDs. A PKCS#8 private
key cannot identify the signer of a candidate certificate and is not a
valid trust anchor.
-
CVE-2026-99219
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Initialize modname and offset in print_rec()
print_rec() leaves 'modname' and 'offset' uninitialized and
kallsyms_lookup() only sets them on success. When the lookup fails like
when a module is being loaded or unloaded, 'modname' holds a garbage
value, passes the 'if (modname)' check, and is dereferenced by
seq_printf().
Oops: general protection fault
RIP: 0010:string+0x48/0xe0
Call Trace:
vsnprintf+0x1f5/0x650
seq_printf+0x8e/0xb0
print_rec+0x6c/0xc0
t_show+0x4c/0x440
seq_read_iter+0x119/0x480
This can be triggered by reading available_filter_functions while a
module is being loaded or unloaded.
Initialize both variables so a failed lookup skips the module name.
-
CVE-2026-99218
•
published on November 2, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coredump: hold RCU while releasing parked threads
coredump_finish() releases the parked threads by clearing -task in
their core_thread entry and calling wake_up_process() on each of them.
It does that without holding a reference on the task and without being
inside rcu.
But calling wake_up_process(task) without rcu here isn't safe. A parked
thread doesn't need that wakeup to leave. A spurious wakeup or a
preemption after the store is enough for the task to go away.
So if the coredump client is preempted between the store and
wake_up_process() the thread can exit and be freed in the meantime and
try_to_wake_up() takes pi_lock in freed memory.
Hold rcu across the loop.
-
CVE-2026-99216
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Drivers: hv: Don't reset VMBus connection state on error/exit paths
In two places, current code forces vmbus_connection.conn_state to
DISCONNECTED prior to calling vmbus_disconnect(). But vmbus_disconnect()
calls vmbus_initiate_unload(), which unloads the VMBus connection
only if the conn_state is CONNECTED. Consequently, the connection
remains and the Hyper-V host might continue to send messages or post
VMBus interrupts.
The problem was introduced in commit 74347a99e73ae ("x86/Hyper-V:
Unload vmbus channel in hv panic callback"), in that
vmbus_initiate_unload() started checking the current connection
state before doing the unload. This commit removed some occurrences
where conn_state was forced to DISCONNECTED, but these two remained,
apparently due to an oversight at the time.
Fix this by not forcing conn_state to DISCONNECTED during VMBus exit,
or if a failure occurs when establishing the connection in the first
place. Whatever value conn_state has at the time is then read by
vmbus_initiate_unload() to determine if there is a connection to
be unloaded.
-
CVE-2026-99215
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: core: prevent unregistering a power supply while a callback runs
Once a power supply is registered, its callbacks can immediately start
firing from other contexts, such as external_power_changed() triggered by
the TCPM stack. If a power supply is unregistered while the callback is
still running, the driver data can already be freed when the callback
tries to access it, leading to a use-after-free.
This happens e.g. when the hardware bus carrying the power supply device
malfunctions (e.g. I2C is hogged down by another malfunctioning device)
immediately after the power supply is registered, and thus the core is
still processing the callbacks which were queued up when the driver
starts the removal, leading in some cases to a kernel crash, e.g.:
[ 11.645942] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000005
[ 11.646751] Mem abort info:
[ 11.647006] ESR = 0x0000000096000004
[ 11.647338] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 11.647806] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 11.648077] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 11.648356] FSC = 0x04: level 0 translation fault
[ 11.648785] Data abort info:
[ 11.649041] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004, ISS2 = 0x00000000
[ 11.649524] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
[ 11.649981] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0
[ 11.650390] [0000000000000005] user address but active_mm is swapper
[ 11.650955] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000004 [#1] SMP
[ 11.651460] Modules linked in:
[ 11.651742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 144 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc6-g62a9297af2cd #1 PREEMPT
[ 11.652553] Hardware name: Flipper One rev. F0B1C2 (DT)
[ 11.653024] Workqueue: events power_supply_changed_work
[ 11.653511] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 11.654135] pc : __power_supply_is_supplied_by+0x18/0x100
[ 11.654624] lr : __power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x40/0xb8
[ 11.655098] sp : ffff80008192bb30
[ 11.655399] x29: ffff80008192bb30 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 11.656049] x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 11.656695] x23: ffff0000c19f4200 x22: ffffdb2232ba4ea8 x21: ffff80008192bc28
[ 11.657344] x20: ffff0000c1eef000 x19: ffff80008192bc18 x18: 00000000a0886e62
[ 11.657991] x17: 000000040044ffff x16: 04500072b5503510 x15: 0000000000000000
[ 11.658639] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000220 x12: 0000000000000000
[ 11.659286] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: ffff0000c1fdb2b0 x9 : ffffdb2232ba5590
[ 11.659934] x8 : 00000000e5b906e6 x7 : ffff0000c2502778 x6 : ffffdb22339793d0
[ 11.660581] x5 : ffff80008192bc18 x4 : ffff0000c19cbca0 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 11.661228] x2 : ffff0000c1fdaf40 x1 : ffffffffffffffed x0 : ffff0000c1eef000
[ 11.661878] Call trace:
[ 11.662103] __power_supply_is_supplied_by+0x18/0x100 (P)
[ 11.662596] __power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x40/0xb8
[ 11.663040] psy_for_each_psy_cb+0x20/0x40
[ 11.663416] class_for_each_device+0x110/0x150
[ 11.663825] power_supply_am_i_supplied+0x68/0x100
[ 11.664262] bq257xx_external_power_changed+0x58/0x140
[ 11.664733] __power_supply_changed_work+0x60/0x80
[ 11.665170] psy_for_each_psy_cb+0x20/0x40
[ 11.665545] class_for_each_device+0x110/0x150
[ 11.665953] power_supply_changed_work+0x98/0x1b8
[ 11.666382] process_one_work+0x164/0x4c0
[ 11.666758] worker_thread+0x19c/0x320
[ 11.667104] kthread+0x138/0x150
[ 11.667408] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 11.667744] Code: d503233f a9bd7bfd 910003fd a90153f3 (f9400c34)
[ 11.668294] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Add a read-write semaphore between external_power_changed() and
power_supply_unregister() to prevent the latter from returning (and thus
the driver from freeing its data) while the callback is still running.
-
CVE-2026-99214
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: hdmi: Move packet RAM enable to PM runtime
Audio can be triggered by the HPD handler and start up before video has
been restored, calling vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() for the audio infoframe.
vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() needs Packet RAM to be on to store the
infoframe, however, if the video hasn't been enabled,
vc4_hdmi_encoder_post_crtc_enable() hasn't been called and therefore, the
Packet RAM can be disabled by the time vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe() executes,
causing the following splat:
[ 201.570266] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 201.570293] Packet RAM has to be on to store the packet.
[ 201.570367] WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_hdmi.c:683 at vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe+0x404/0x494 [vc4], CPU#0: wireplumber/1606
[...]
[ 201.658650] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.5 (DT)
[...]
[ 201.758499] Call trace:
[ 201.760967] vc4_hdmi_write_infoframe+0x404/0x494 [vc4] (P)
[ 201.766607] vc4_hdmi_write_audio_infoframe+0x1c/0x28 [vc4]
[ 201.772247] write_infoframe+0xbc/0x140 [drm_display_helper]
[ 201.777975] drm_atomic_helper_connector_hdmi_update_audio_infoframe+0x80/0xdc [drm_display_helper]
[ 201.787140] vc4_hdmi_audio_prepare+0x4ac/0x570 [vc4]
[ 201.792252] drm_connector_hdmi_audio_prepare+0x24/0x30 [drm_display_helper]
[ 201.799390] hdmi_codec_prepare+0x100/0x160 [snd_soc_hdmi_codec]
[ 201.805471] snd_soc_pcm_dai_prepare+0xd4/0x100 [snd_soc_core]
[ 201.811375] __soc_pcm_prepare+0x60/0x12c [snd_soc_core]
[ 201.816752] soc_pcm_prepare+0x34/0x58 [snd_soc_core]
[ 201.821863] snd_pcm_do_prepare+0x70/0x8c [snd_pcm]
[ 201.826798] snd_pcm_action_nonatomic+0xe4/0x174 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.832350] snd_pcm_prepare+0xc8/0xd8 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.837021] snd_pcm_common_ioctl+0x458/0x614 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.842308] snd_pcm_ioctl+0x30/0x48 [snd_pcm]
[ 201.846802] __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x88/0xd8
[ 201.850769] invoke_syscall+0x48/0xf4
[ 201.854470] el0_svc_common+0x80/0xd8
[ 201.858171] do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
[ 201.861520] el0_svc+0x3c/0xb0
[ 201.864605] el0t_64_sync_handler+0x68/0xdc
[ 201.868834] el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c
[ 201.872536] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Considering that Packet RAM enable is essentially a power management
configuration, move its enabling/disabling to the Runtime PM hooks.
Note that post_crtc_disable() still stops all infoframes, but keeps Packet
RAM enabled, leaving it to be disabled by runtime suspend.
-
CVE-2026-99213
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: treat TCP_CLOSING as once-established
Handle the TCP_ESTABLISHED - TCP_CLOSING transition on OP_RST, which can
race with the connect loop. Immediately break and return 0 on
ESTABLISHED/CLOSING. The return value of connect() should reflect what
happened up to the point the connection was established or failed. Events
that occur afterwards must not affect it. E.g. even if OP_RW has already
set sk_err, connect() should still return 0, not ENOBUFS because of it.
Adapt the inaccurate comment above signal_pending().
Resetting a socket that is still present in connected_table can lead to
memory corruption. The reporter noted lost transports for in-flight skbs,
and I have reproduced crashes caused by re-insertion into connected_table.
list_add double add: new=, prev=, next=.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:35!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
Workqueue: vsock-loopback vsock_loopback_work
RIP: 0010:__list_add_valid_or_report+0x11f/0x130
Call Trace:
vsock_insert_connected.cold+0xe/0x13
virtio_transport_recv_pkt+0x10e9/0x1460
vsock_loopback_work+0x305/0x480
process_one_work+0xe4c/0x1560
worker_thread+0x4f1/0xd60
kthread+0x36e/0x470
ret_from_fork+0x47b/0x6b0
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
This fix is supplementary to commit 002541ef650b ("vsock: Ignore
signal/timeout on connect() if already established"). Details under Link.
-
CVE-2026-99212
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/rds: don't let the rdma_cm destroy an id RDS still owns on route failure
rds_rdma_cm_event_handler_cmn() hands the return value of
rdma_resolve_route() straight back to the rdma_cm on
RDMA_CM_EVENT_ADDR_RESOLVED. A synchronous failure there - -ENOMEM
from the route work allocation, an SA query that cannot be set up, a
RoCE route with no usable device - makes addr_handler() destroy the
id the event was delivered on. That id is ic-i_cm_id, and nothing
clears the pointer: the connection sits in RDS_CONN_CONNECTING with a
freed id until its shutdown calls rdma_disconnect() and
rdma_destroy_id() on it.
The ROUTE_RESOLVED case already avoids this: rds_ib_cm_initiate_connect()
forces a zero return while ic->i_cm_id == cm_id, as the comment there
explains. Do the same here - drop the connection and return 0 - so
the id stays RDS's to destroy from the shutdown, and the reconnect
gets a fresh one.
-
CVE-2026-99211
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netlink: reset skb headers before unicast and multicast filtering
Socket filters can use SKF_NET_OFF and SKF_LL_OFF to read relative to
an skb's network and MAC headers. Netlink producers may reserve
headroom without resetting those headers, allowing a receiving socket's
filter to read data before the initialized message.
For example, IWPM HELLO replies are allocated with dev_alloc_skb(),
which reserves NET_SKB_PAD bytes. An unprivileged NETLINK_RDMA user can
attach a classic socket filter and disclose this headroom through the
length of the delivered reply. The resets in netlink_dump() do not help
because IWPM sends a separately allocated skb through netlink_unicast().
Reset both headers before running the receiver's filter in unicast and
broadcast delivery, as is already done for dump skbs. This also covers
other netlink producers that reserve headroom without changing their
allocation or message-building code.
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CVE-2026-99210
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/rocket: clear rdev on device init failure
rocket_probe() stores the return value from rocket_device_init() in the
file-scoped rdev pointer before checking whether it is an error pointer.
If rocket_device_init() fails, rdev is left as an ERR_PTR.
The rdev pointer is also used as the marker for whether the shared rocket
device has already been initialized. A later core probe can therefore see
a non-NULL rdev, skip rocket_device_init(), and dereference the error
pointer when reading rdev-num_cores.
Save the error code and clear rdev before returning from the
rocket_device_init() failure path.
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CVE-2026-99209
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: skip eviction of a BO with no resource
xe_evict_flags() switches on tbo-resource->mem_type to choose an
eviction placement. An xe BO can reach eviction with no ttm.resource,
e.g. an imported dma-buf BO whose resource was freed during teardown
while its attachment is still live: the exporter then invalidates it via
xe_dma_buf_move_notify() -> xe_bo_evict(), and the switch dereferences a
NULL resource and faults.
A BO with no resource has nothing placed or mapped, so there is nothing
to evict. Return an empty placement (num_placement = 0), mirroring the
handling already used for non-xe scatter-gather BOs just above;
ttm_bo_validate() then takes the pipeline-gutting path and returns 0.
Without the fix the xe_dma_buf@xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource
dynamic live selftest will fail with below stack.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000010
RIP: 0010:xe_evict_flags+0xf4/0x140 [xe]
Call Trace:
TASK>
xe_bo_evict+0x40/0xa0 [xe]
? ttm_bo_pipeline_gutting+0x71/0x180 [ttm]
xe_test_dmabuf_move_notify_no_resource+0x182/0x440 [xe]
xe_dma_buf_kunit+0x387/0x580 [xe]
v2: Add Fixes tag and failure info in commit text (Matt Brost)
(cherry picked from commit dbcfaac6331f1fcb0c2fe3ad3e9adb1e5d43ec0c)
-
CVE-2026-99208
•
published on October 28, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Zero OA buffer at allocation
ttm_bo_type_kernel BOs are not guaranteed to be zeroed on allocation and
may contain data from previously freed pages. Since the OA buffer is
mmap'able by userspace, this can expose stale kernel memory contents.
Streams opened with DRM_XE_OA_PROPERTY_OA_DISABLED allocate the OA
buffer without calling xe_oa_init_oa_buffer(). Zero the buffer at
allocation to prevent information disclosure through mmap.
The existing zeroing in xe_oa_init_oa_buffer() remains necessary for
zero report-id/timestamp detection on enable/re-enable.
(cherry picked from commit 126c4c5388f9311a390b9b254a835b0cf0f55331)
